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In a panel discussion at the 2004 annual meeting, the International
Law Association (American Branch)' Law of the Sea Committee
considered a handful of terms in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
and its 1994 amending Agreement2 for which the Convention does not
1. Hereinafter ABILA. The ABILA Law of the Sea Committee is referred to
hereinafter as the LOS Committee or the Committee.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, (amending
UNCLOS) [hereinafter 1994 Agreement]. See generally R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE
LAW OF THE SEA 17-20 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing UNCLOS negotiations); 1 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 113-34 (Myron H. Nordquist
ed., 1985) [hereinafter I COMMENTARY] (same). To date the U.N. law of the sea "package" is
completed by the 1994 Agreement and the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks & Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-24, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
2
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supply definitions. What may be the end of this project will come
when the United States, which has not ratified or acceded to the
Convention,3 has the Convention and the Agreement on the U.S.
Senate floor for advice and consent4 after the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has favorably endorsed the agreements. Although the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave its endorsement during the
108th Congress,6 pursuant to Senate rules, the Convention and
Agreement returned to the Foreign Relations Committee at the end of
the last Congressional session.7 When they will be reported out again
is less than clear.
In recommending Senate advice and consent, the Foreign
Relations Committee appended over 25 understandings,8 statements,
Straddling Stocks Convention]. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra, 19-22 (discussing the 1994
Agreement and Straddling Stocks Convention negotiations); S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-24, at
v-xvi (1998) (discussing the Straddling Stocks Convention).
3. See 2 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2004 284-86, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/23, U.N.
Sales No. E.05.V.3 (2005) [hereinafter 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES]. As of Dec. 31, 2004,
147 States were parties to UNCLOS, 119 States were parties to the 1994 Agreement, and 52
States were parties to the Straddling Stocks Convention. Id. at 284, 322, 326.
4. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. No. 106-15, at Rule 30(1) (2000).
6. RICHARD LUGAR, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 108-10 at 1 (2004) [hereinafter S. EXEC. REP. No. 108-10].
7. S. Doc. No. 106-15, at Rule 30(2).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 313
cmt. g (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] defines understandings as follows:
When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a
unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation. Whatever it is
called, it constitutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or modify
[a] state's legal obligation. Sometimes . . . a declaration purports to be an
"understanding," an interpretation of the agreement in a particular respect. Such
an interpretive declaration is not a reservation if it reflects the accepted view of the
agreement. But another contracting party may challenge the expressed
understanding, treating it as a reservation which it is not prepared to accept.
Id. Whiteman's Digest defines understandings, declarations and statements:
"[U]nderstanding" is often used to designate a statement when it is not intended to
modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty in its international operation but
is intended merely to clarify or explain or to deal with some other matter incidental
to the operation of the treaty in a manner other than as a substantive reservation.
Sometimes an understanding is no more than a statement of policies or principles
or perhaps an indication of internal procedures for carrying out provisions of the
treaty.
. . . "[Dieclaration" and "statement" are used most often when it is considered
essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters of policy or principle,
without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or obligations
stipulated in a treaty.
14 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17 (1970); see also id. § 21;
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 101-02 (2000); 5 GREEN HAYWORD
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 479 (1943) (quoting Draft Convention on the
3
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and conditions for the Convention and the 1994 Agreement.' The
treaty is a "package deal" that only allows reservations when the
Law of Treaties, with Comment, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 843 (Supp. 1935); FRANK HORN,
RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES § 25.2
(1988); 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 519, at 1436 (2d ed. 1945); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW, pt. 2, § 614, at 1241-43 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 52-54 (2d ed. 1984).
Before the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention], an "impressive number" of writers had said that
interpretative declarations, i.e., understandings, or interpretive declarations in RESTATEMENT,
supra § 313 cmt. g parlance, must be assimilated to reservations. HORN, supra, § 24.1, at
230. McNair's The Law of Treaties did not examine understandings, declarations or
statements, except in contexts of their amounting to international agreements or as options to
a treaty. ARNOLD D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 32 (2d ed. 1961). See generally id. at 7-
15. Horn refers to unilateral declarations, statements or understandings as "interpretative
declarations." HORN, supra, §§ 24-27. The International Law Commission multilateral
treaties project defines interpretative declarations:
"Interpretative declaration" means a unilateral statement, however phrased or
named, made by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or
that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by
the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions. . . . The character of a
unilateral statement as a reservation or an interpretative declaration is determined
by the legal effect it purports to produce.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Text of Draft Guidelines on Reservations to Treaties Provisionally
Adopted So Far by the Commission, in Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-
fifth Session (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2003), at 168, U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 ILC Rep.]. The ILC is researching the law of treaties related to multilateral
reservations after receiving U.N. General Assembly endorsement for the project. Id. at 148
(citing G.A. Res. 48/31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/31 (Dec. 9, 1993); G.A. Res. 49/51, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/51 (Dec. 9, 1994).
The RESTATEMENT discusses understandings in the U.S. practice context:
A treaty that is ratified or acceded to by the United States with a statement of
understanding becomes effective in domestic law ([RESTATEMENT, supra] § 111)
subject to that understanding. If no such statement is made, indication that the
President or the Senate ascribed a particular meaning to the treaty is relevant to the
interpretation of the treaty by a United States court in much the same way that the
legislative history of a statute is relevant to its interpretation. See [id.] § 325,
Reporters' Note 5; § 326, Reporters' Note 2.
Although the Senate's resolution of consent may contain no statement of
understanding, there may be such statements in the report of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee or in the Senate debates. In that event, the President must
decide whether they represent a general understanding by the Senate and, if he
finds that they do, must respect them in good faith.
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 314 cmt. d; see also id. § 303 cmt. d.
9. Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification, in S. ExEc. REP. No. 108-
10, supra note 5, at 16-21 [hereinafter Text]. See generally Summary of Key Provisions of the
Convention and Implementing Agreement, in S. ExEc. REP. No. 108-10, supra note 5, at 2-6.
For another analysis from the U.S. Executive perspective see United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part
XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annex, S. TREATY Doc. No.
103-39 (1994) [hereinafter S. TREATY Doc. No. 103].
4
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Convention specifically permits them.10 However, UNCLOS does
allow understandings. It
does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this
Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or
named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and
regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such
declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal
effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that
State."
The Foreign Relations Committee proposals for understandings,
conditions, and declarations are subject to Senate floor action,
including amendments, and perhaps recommittal to the Committee.
Of course, the Senate can refuse advice and consent to the Convention
with or without understandings, conditions, and declarations.
Although the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and
witnesses testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee strongly
endorsed the Convention, 2 debate over whether the United States
should accede has erupted anew.'3 Even so, final Senate action may
come in 2006. If the Senate approves the treaty and its protocol, the
President is expected to exchange ratifications, after which the
10. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 309. The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as
"a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State .... " Vienna
Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(d). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 313 cmt. a, 314
& cmts. a-c (repeating the Vienna Convention definition; defining and discussing U.S.
international reservations practice); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 584-87 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES]; McNAIR, supra note 8, at
158-77; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, §§ 614-19, at 1241-48;
SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 51-82.
11. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 310 (referring to art. 309).
12. Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994
Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing Before S. Envtl. &
Pub. Works Comm., 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2004/
30723.htm (statement of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans &
International Environmental & Scientific Affairs) (reciting the Department's reasons for
advocating advice and consent and responding to arguments against ratification); see also S.
EXEC. REP. No. 108-10, supra note 5, at 23-187 (testimony); S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-39,
supra note 9, at v.
13. E.g., Editorial, Bottom-of-the-Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2004, at A18
(opposing advice and consent); Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Letter to the Editor, Don't Cut the
Hawsers on Law of Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2004, at A15 (Chair, U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, predicting the failure of U.S. interests if UNCLOS is not ratified);
Rhonda McMillion, Troubled Waters, A.B.A.J., June 2004, at 62 (expressing ABA support
for UNCLOS); Editorial, Rescuing the Law of the Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, § 4, at 48
(advocating advice and consent).
5
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Convention will be in force for the United States. 4 At that point the
four 1958 law of the sea treaties, 5 upon which the United States has
relied for nearly a half century along with customary rules, 6 will be
superseded by UNCLOS for the United States and its UNCLOS treaty
partners. 7
14. Nothing requires a President to exchange ratifications after Senate advice and
consent. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl.2.
15. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 311(1). Unlike UNCLOS, the 1958 law of the sea
treaties [hereinafter, collectively, 1958 LOS Conventions], which are still in force for states
that are not UNCLOS parties, allow reservations to some or all of their terms. Convention on
the Continental Shelf art. 12, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter
Shelf Convention] (allowing reservations at signature, ratification or accession but barring
reservations to arts. 1-3); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas art. 19, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Fishing
Convention] (allowing reservations at signature, ratification or accession but barring
reservations to arts. 6-7, 9-12); Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention] (not excluding any articles from
reservations); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention] (same). See
generally 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 3, at 265-82 (listing reservations,
understandings, and objections to reservations to the 1958 LOS Conventions); UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2005, at 419, 453-54 (2005)
[hereinafter TIF].
16. Since 1983 the United States has recognized the navigational articles of UNCLOS
as reflecting customary law. United States Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383
(Mar. 10, 1983). Commentators generally agree. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, pt. V,
introductory n.; Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, 73 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 1, para. 1.1 (1999) [hereinafter NWP I-14M
Annotated]; John Norton Moore, Introduction, in 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at xxvii;
Bernard H. Oxman, International Law and Naval and Air Operations at Sea, 64 NAVAL WAR
C. INT'L L. STUD. 19, 29 (1991). But see 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 48-49 (I.A. Shearer ed., 1982) (researched through 1978, which may reflect thinking
during UNCLOS's early drafting years); George K. Walker, The Tanker War 1980-88: Law
and Policy, 74 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. i, 306 n.3 (2000) [hereinafter Walker, The
Tanker].
17. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 311(1). This is consonant with the Vienna Convention.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 59(1); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 332(2);
AUST, supra note 8, at 173-74, 181-83, 235-36; BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 593;
Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of the Second
Part of Its Seventeenth Session (Monaco, 3-28 January 1966), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1
(1966) [hereinafter 1966 ILC Rep.], reprinted in 2 UNITED NATIONS, Y.B. OF THE INT'L L.
COMM'N at 252-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add. 1 (1966) [hereinafter 2 U.N., Y.B.];
McNMAR, supra note 8, at 506-09; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, §
648, at 1299-1300; SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 184; 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY paras. 311.1-311.5, 311.11 (Shabtai Rosenne et al.
eds., 1989) [hereinafter 5 COMMENTARY].
Aust and Lowe report some states' views that the 1958 LOS Conventions cannot be
terminated because they lack denunciation clauses. AUST, supra note 8, at 234; A.V. Lowe,
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the Contemporary Law of
the Sea, 64 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L STUD. 109, 121 (1991) [hereinafter Lowe, Commander's
Handbook]. But see 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 3, at 269 n.6, 278 n.3. This view
6
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Debates over U.S. ratification, the law of treaties related to
understandings, and the like apart, the LOS Committee project raises
the separate issue of the relationship between commentator-developed
definitions and States' declarations or understandings to the
Convention. After Part I of this article discusses the Committee's
methodology in deriving and refining definitions, Part II analyzes the
role of definitions relative to States' declarations and understandings
to the Convention. Part III publishes a final round of proposed
definitions. "8
I. THE ABILA LOS COMMITTEE PROJECT
This Journal has previously recorded work on the ABILA LOS
Committee project, as has the biennial ABILA Proceedings. 9 The
definitions project began in 2001 with a September 4, 2001 Initial
is largely moot as most 1958 treaty parties are UNCLOS and 1994 Agreement parties, with a
major exception being the United States, and many, including the United States, are
provisional parties under the 1994 Agreement. Compare id. at 284-86, 322-24 with TIF,
supra note 15, at 419, 453-54 (Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African
Republic, Dominican Republic, Israel, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Thailand, and the United
States are parties to one or more 1958 LOS Conventions but not UNCLOS). The 1958 LOS
Conventions will remain in force for the United States and states party to them that are not
UNCLOS parties. See 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 3, at 270 n.7, 276 n.7, 282 n.7.
Commentators differ on the legal effect of a lack of a denunciation clause. Compare AuST,
supra note 8, at 233-35, with RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 332(2), and BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 592-93, and McNAIR, supra note 8, at 510-14, and 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 647, at 1298-99, and SINCLAIR,
supra note 8, at 186-88. The Vienna Convention does not allow denunciation unless it is
established that the parties intended the possibility of denunciation or that the treaty's nature
implies denunciation, and a twelve-month notice period is required in either case. Vienna
Convention, supra note 8, art. 56. UNCLOS allows denunciation with one year's notice, but
an international organization cannot denounce it if a member of the organization is a party.
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 317(1); id. annex IX, art. 8(c)(i). See generally 5 COMMENTARY,
supra, paras. 317.1-317.9, A.IX.I 1.
18. Part III publishes definitions and other material to which the LOS Committee has
agreed as a Tentative Draft. Parts I and H are extracts from the 2004 Tentative Draft.
19. See George K. Walker, Report of the Law of the Sea Committee; Defining Terms in
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention III: Analysis of Selected IHO ECDIS Glossary and Other
Terms (Dec. 12, 2003 Initial Draft, Revision 1), 2003-04 PROC. AM. BRANCH INT'L L. ASS'N
187 [hereinafter Report, Defining]; George K. Walker, Defining Terms in the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention III: The International Hydrographic Organization ECDIS Glossary, 34 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 211 (2004) [hereinafter Walker, Definitions III]; George K. Walker & John E.
Noyes, Definitions for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 32 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 343 (2002)
[hereinafter Walker & Noyes, Definitions 1], reprinting George K. Walker, Defining Terms in
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Sept. 4, 2001 Initial Draft) (Rev. 1, Jan. 22, 2002),
2001-02 PROC. AM. BRANCH INT'L L. ASS'N 154; George K. Walker & John E. Noyes,
Definitions for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention - Part II, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 191
(2003) [hereinafter Walker & Noyes, Definitions II].
7
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Draft submitted for the 2001 annual meeting. Minor revisions were
made, and Revision 1 was published.2° A further proposed revision,
Tentative Draft No. 1 (September 4, 2002, revised February 10, 2003),
based on suggested revisions and updated citations, was submitted to
the ABILA Law of the Sea Committee (LOS Committee, or
Committee) for the 2002 annual meeting. At that meeting the Chair
also presented 60 more proposed definitions, based on the
Consolidated Glossary of Technical Terms Used in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, published by the International
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) Technical Aspects of the Law of
the Sea Working Group.2 That analysis has been published with
commentary by John E. Noyes.22 In 2003, the Committee considered
definitions in the IHO Glossary of ECDIS-Related Terms, which
remains unpublished except on the IHO website; that analysis has also
20. John E. Noyes, Treaty Interpretation and Definitions in the Law of the Sea
Convention: Comments on Defining Terms in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Sept. 4,
2001 Initial Draft) (Rev. 1, Jan 22, 2002), 2001-02 PROC. AM. BRANCH INT'L L. ASS'N 175,
reprinted in Walker & Noyes, Definitions I, supra note 19, at 367-83; George K. Walker,
Defining Terms in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Sept. 4, 2001 Initial Draft) (Rev. 1,
Jan. 22, 2002), 2001-02 PRoc. AM. BRANCH INT'L L. ASS'N 154, reprinted in Walker &
Noyes, Definitions 1, supra note 19, at 347-66.
21. Int'l Hydrographic Org. Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea Working Group,
Consolidated Glossary of Technical Terms Used in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, in International Hydrographic Bureau Special Publication No. 5 1, appendix I
(1989), and United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Baselines 46-62
(1989) [hereinafter Consolidated Glossary], reprinted in NWP l- 14M Annotated, supra note
16, annex Al-5, at 51-77. The Consolidated Glossary has not been updated. E-mail from
Steve Shipman, Professional Assistant (Hydrography), International Hydrographic
Organization to George K. Walker, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law
(Mar. 11, 2004) (on file with the author). The Consolidated Glossary was one of four sources
for Annex 1: Glossary of Technical Terms, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC
AND LEGAL INTERFACE 321-30 (Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Annex 1]. Other sources for Annex 1 were AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INST., DICTIONARY OF
GEOLOGICAL TERMS (Robert L. Bates & Julia A. Jackson, eds., 3d ed. 1984); AMERICAN
GEOLOGICAL INST., GLOSSARY OF GEOLOGY (Julia A. Jackson, ed., 4th ed. 1997); ASS'N FOR
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION & EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY, ONLINE DICTIONARY (1996, rev.
2005), at http.'//www.agi.org.uk/POOLED/articles/bf trainart/view.asp ?Q=bftrainart
156551.
Since Annex 1 represents consolidated thinking on definitions, Walker & Noyes, Definitions
11, supra note 19, at 219-309, did not cite these publications separately. The chair thanks
Professor Noyes for suggesting Annex 1. Insofar as can be determined, sources like Cook &
Carleton's Annex I do not reference the International Hydrographic Organization's Glossary
of ECDIS-Related Terms. Int'l Hydrographic Bureau, Glossary of ECDIS-Related Terms, in
SPECIFICATIONS FOR CHART CONTENT AND DISPLAY ASPECTS OF ECDIS, app. 3 (3d ed. Dec.
1997), at http://www.iho.shom.fr/publicat/free/files/S52a3e3e.pdf.
22. Walker & Noyes, Definitions H, supra note 19, at 219-324.
8
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been published. 23  For 2004, the Committee considered terms
submitted by a Committee member, and the Chair expanded research
on them to include other, related terms.24
The research procedure followed by the ABILA LOS Committee
began when the Chair circulated an Initial Draft for comment by
Committee members and other interested individuals, such as other
ABILA members who were not LOS Committee members but who
wished to participate. Committee members then considered the Initial
Draft and those comments at a Committee meeting during the ABILA
annual meeting. When there were corrections, a revised Initial Draft
sometimes followed. The Committee Chair then circulated a
Tentative Draft among Committee members and other interested
individuals for further comments. In general, a Tentative Draft, once
approved by the Committee, is not subject to general discussion and
wholesale revision until the end of the process unless the Committee
wishes to do so for a particular term. A resulting Final Draft,
combining the work of several years, may be published, in ILA
materials, for example, for consideration by the general ILA
membership and others, with an invitation to submit more comments.
If, at the end of this stage, the Committee wishes to revisit and discuss
a term, it will be placed on the Committee agenda for the next ABILA
annual meeting, or it may be considered in correspondence. Since
2004 was the final year for considering UNCLOS terms for definition,
a Final Draft will be circulated before the 2006 ABILA annual
meeting. As with all ILA projects, the Final Draft will not necessarily
represent any State's or international organization's practice, views, or
policy unless that State or international organization chooses to adopt
23. Report, Defining, supra note 19; Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19.
Headquartered in Monaco, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) is organized
under the Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, May 3, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1857, 751 U.N.T.S. 41. See generally CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 415-16.
Its 62 member States as of January 1, 2004 include many maritime countries, e.g., the United
States. TIF, supra note 15, at 430. Treaty succession principles for China, the former USSR
and the former Yugoslavia, IHO members, may mean that even more countries are
Convention parties. Id. at 404 & nn. 1-5 (treaty succession issues for China, Federal Republic
of Germany, German Democratic Republic, former USSR, former Yugoslavia; Ukraine
already a party); see also Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in
Eastern Europe, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1993); George K. Walker, Integration and
Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1993).
24. See e-mail from Howard S. Schiffman, Assistant Professor of Law, New York
University, to George K. Walker, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law
(Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Shiffman E-mail] (on file with author); infra Part III.
9
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it in whole or part. This analysis method is similar to that which the
ILA has employed elsewhere, such as in drafting the Helsinki
Principles of Maritime Neutrality,25 and also employed by the
American Law Institute in developing the Restatements and by the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law in preparing the San
Remo Manual.26
Formats follow an English alphabetical order (e.g., "mile" ahead
of "ocean space"). After reciting a term for definition, it is followed
by Discussion and Analysis, including references to UNCLOS
provisions, other treaties, such as the 1958 LOS Conventions,
treatises, cases, and articles. Comments summarize correspondence
from those who proposed terms. Conclusions end each entry. This
Initial Draft will be blended into a Final Draft in which the terms
considered in 2004 and those analyzed below in Part III will be
interspersed among terms formerly considered. The project will not
revisit terms UNCLOS defines; 21 it avoids definitions not consistent
with the Convention, e.g., the difference between archipelagos as
geographers define them and the meaning of "archipelago" in
UNCLOS. 28 It will not enter debates on what are customary norms
requiring no definition of terms 29 or the wisdom of ratifying
UNCLOS.30
25. Int'l Law Ass'n Comm. on Maritime Neutrality, Final Report: Helsinki Principles
on Maritime Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH
CONFERENCE HELD AT TAIPEI, TAIwAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 24-30 MAY 1998, at 496-516
(1998) [hereinafter Helsinki Principles], reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1425-30 (4th rev. ed. 2004) (less Commentaries).
26. See Salah El-Din Amer et al., Explanation, in SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 57, 61-67 (Louise Doswald-
Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL].
27. E.g., UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 1(1)(1) (the Area), 2-3 (territorial sea), 8(1)
(internal waters), 13(1) (low-tide elevation), 33 (contiguous zone), 46 (archipelago,
archipelagic State), 53 (archipelagic sea lane), 55 (exclusive economic zone (EEZ)), 76
(continental shelf, continental margin), 121(1) (island), 122 (enclosed or semi-enclosed sea);
see also Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 224-25.
28. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 46-48; see also Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19,
at 229.
29. E.g., the now largely resolved debate on the customary maximum width of the
territorial sea. See generally Walker, The Tanker, supra note 16, at 260-68.
30. See id. 305-06; supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
10
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II. THE ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP OF UNDERSTANDINGS,
DECLARATIONS, AND STATEMENTS APPENDED TO UNCLOS AND THE
ABILA LOS COMMITTEE DEFINITIONS PROJECT
Part II comments on the role and relationship of understandings,
declarations, or statements States might file, or have filed, with
respect to UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement when they are
considered with sources like the ABILA LOS Committee definitions
project. There are important considerations on the place of
commentator definitions.
Definitions that commentators research and publish as their work
are a secondary source of law. They can provide content to primary
sources, such as treaties, customary rules, general principles of law,
and court or arbitral decisions.3 Definitions may also be considered
by analogy to subsequent practice under a treaty.32 If LOS Committee
definitions vary from other secondary sources, decision makers should
weigh the ABILA LOS Committee definitions with other commentary
to derive rules of law.33 If a primary source, such as a treaty definition
31. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 156 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 102-03; see
also BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 3-29; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 8, pt. 1, §§ 8-17, at 23-52.
32. The Vienna Convention declares subsequent practice is an interpretation principle
along with other factors. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(3)(b); see also AUST,
supra note 8, at 194-95; BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 602-05; 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 632, at 1274-75; MCNAIR, supra note 8, at 424
("[T]he relative conduct of the contracting parties after the conclusion of the treaty ... has
high probative value as to the intention of the parties at the time of its conclusion."); Eduardo
Jimtnez. de Ardchaga, International Law in the Last Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 42-43 (1978); G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 203, 223-25 (1957) (subsequent practice "superior" source to determine meaning); G.G.
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1951).
The 1966 ILC Report notes that Vienna Convention Conference negotiators rejected a
proposed provision that "[a] treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions." 1966 ILC
Rep., supra note 17, reprinted in 2 U.N., Y.B., supra note 17, at 236; see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 8, §§ 325(2) & cmt. c (rule that subsequent practice can modify treaty conforms to
U.S. practice); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 601 (article rejected at Conference
adopting Vienna Convention); SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 135-38 (subsequent practice can
modify treaty terms); Richard D. Keamey & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 523-25 (1970).
33. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2745, 2766-69 (2004) (Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens, O'Conner, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.). Justice Souter quotes The
Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), for cautionary use of scholars' opinions, as evidence
of the law:
11
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in custom or practice under a treaty, or in the treaty itself, recites a
different definition, the primary source should have priority.
34
Where there is a conflict between a commentator definition and a
definition in the U.N. Charter, a definition in a U.N. Security Council
decision, or a jus cogens-supported definition, the Charter,35 the
definition in a decision, 36 or the jus cogens37-supported definition has
priority. To be sure, commentators say that today jus cogens "has
"[W]here there is no treaty, and no... custom[] [the Court looks] to the works of
jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.
Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of what
their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of
what the law really is."
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2767 (quoting The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700); see also supra note
31 and accompanying text.
34. See ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(1); see also supra notes 31, 33 and
accompanying text. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 102-03.
35. U.N. Charter art. 103. Although U.N. Charter Article 103 declares Charter primacy
over treaties and not custom or Other sources, Charter definitions should prime secondary-
source definitions like those the LOS Committee proposes. See also LELAND M. GOODRICH
ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 614-17 (3d ed. 1969); 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 592, 1215-16; supra notes 31, 33 and
accompanying text. See generally 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1292-1302
(Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 2 Simma].
36. See U.N. Charter, supra note 35, arts. 25, 48, 94(2), 103; see also GOODRICH ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 207-11, 334-37, 555-59, 614-17; 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
454-62, 776-80 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 1 Simmal; 2 Simma, supra note
35, at 1174-79; W. Michael Reisman, Note, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 87 (1993) (principles flowing from Council decisions pursuant to U.N.
Charter arts. 25 & 103 are treaty law binding U.N. Members and override other treaty
obligations). Article 103 does not apply to custom or jus cogens derived independently of a
treaty, unless, however, Article 103 might be considered a jus cogens norm itself, and a jus
cogens norm superior to otherjus cogens norms, or its principles might be considered a norm
that is superior to conflicting custom. See also ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(1);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 102-03; supra notes 31, 33, 35 and accompanying text.
37. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, pmbl., arts. 53, 64, 71. Jus cogens has
uncertain contours. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 102 reporters' n.6, 323
cmt. b, 331(2), 338(2) (jus cogens's content uncertain); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note
10, at 5, 488-90, 597-98 (same); T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974)
(same); I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 1, § 2, at 7-8 (same); id. pt. 2,
§§ 642, 653, at 1292-93, 1309-10 (same); MCNAIR, supra note 8, at 214-15 (same); SHABTAI
ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at 281-88 (1989); 1 Simma,
supra note 36, at 62 (dispute over self-determination as jus cogens); SINCLAIR, supra note 8,
at 17-18, 218-26 (Vienna Convention, principles considered progressive development in
1984); G. I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (William E. Butler trans., 1974);
Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary Law, 172 RECUEIL DES COURS
219, 262-63 (1981); John N. Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 9, 22-25 (1977); Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, supra note 32, at 64-67;
Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
12
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little relevance to the law of the sea,"38 but that may change in the
future. At least two Charter provisions, Articles 2(4) and 51, have
been said to approach, or to have attained, jus cogens status.3 9
Disputes continue as to these provisions' content, such as the long-
standing argument on whether individual and collective self-defense
includes anticipatory self-defense,' or whether self-defense can be
38. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 6.
39. Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01 (June 27)
(U.N. Charter art. 2(4) approaches jus cogens status); RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 102
cmts. h & k, 905(2) & cmt. g (same); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt.
1, § 2, at 7-8 (art. 2(4) a fundamental norm); Carin Kaghan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent
Right Self-Defense, 3 INT'L L. STUD. ASS'N J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767, 823-27 (1997) (U.N.
Charter art. 51 represents jus cogens norm); see Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the
International Law Commission, Fifty-Third Session (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August
2001), art. 21 & cmt. 1, art. 50 & cmts. 1-5, at 177, 333-34, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 ILC REP.], reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 166, 288-89 (2002) (referring to
"fundamental substantive obligations" and appearing to give U.N. Charter art. 51 the same
status as art. 2(4) when resolving the issue of conflict between them by saying that no art. 2(4)
issues arise if there is a lawful self-defense claim); cf Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8).
40. UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE
paras. 188-92 (2004) [hereinafter A MORE SECURE WORLD] (referring to the nuclear problem
considered by WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
259-60 (1964)); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-45 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
HENKIN, NATIONS]; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620, 1633-35 (1984). The U.N. Charter art. 51 "allows a threatened State,, according
to long established international law .... to take military action as long as the threatened
attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate." A MORE
SECURE WORLD, supra, para. 188. However, a State cannot purport "to act in anticipatory
self-defense, not just preemptively.., but also preventively." Id. para. 189. The latter cases
should be brought to the U.N. Security Council for possible action. Mt para. 190. Article 51
should not be rewritten or reinterpreted. Id. para. 192.
This approach is in line with advocates of a right of anticipatory individual and collective
self-defense based on the Charter and customary law. 2001 ILC REP., supra note 39, art. 25
& cmt. 5, at 194, 196-97, reprinted in CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 178-80 (recognizing
anticipatory self-defense under the necessity doctrine); see also Legality of Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8); Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94, 347-48 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting); STANIMAR A.
ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296
(1996); D.W. BOwETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-93 (1958); TIMOTHY L.H.
MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI
NUCLEAR REACTOR 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302 (1996); MYRES S. McDOUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-41 (1961);
WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 33-48 (1999) (real debate is
scope of anticipatory self-defense right; responses must be proportional); 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 1, § 127, at 417-27; OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 152-58 (1991); JULIUS STONE, OF LAW AND
NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND HUMAN HOPES 3-4 (1974); ANN VAN WYNEN
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-65
13
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(1972); Richard W. Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are At War in the Information Age?, 35
Hous. J. INT'L L. 223, 231, 248 (2000); Louis Rene Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel,
Palestine, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71, 75-77 (1992); George
Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the
First Hit?, 39 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 69, 69-70 (1986); James H. Doyle, Jr., Computer
Networks, Proportionality, and Military Operations, 76 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L STUD. 147, 151-
55 (2002); Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without
Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 51, 68 (2001); Christopher J.
Greenwood, Remarks, Neutrality, The Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in the Persian
Gulf War (Part 1), 82 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 158, 160-61 (1988); Hans Kelsen, Collective
Security Under International Law, 49 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L STUD. 1, 27 (1956); David K.
Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views,
1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 65-84, 122-23 (1991); Lowe, Commander's Handbook, supra
note 17, at 127-30; James J. McHugh, Forcible Self-Help in International Law, 25 NAVAL
WAR C. REV. 61, 61-86 (1972); Rein MUllerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the
Use of Force, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA 93, 109-14 (Lori Fisler Damrosch et al. eds., 1995); John F. Murphy, Commentary on
Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 241, 241 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991)
[hereinafter LAW AND FORCE]; W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use
Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND
FORCE, supra, at 26, 45; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense Against Computer Network
Attack Under International Law, 76 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 121, 140 (2002); Michael
N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its
Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1071 (1998);
Abraham D. Sofaer, Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism,
the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MItL. L. REV. 89, 95 (1989); Robert F. Turner, State
Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression
in the Modern World, 67 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 43, 62-80 (1995); Claud Humphrey
Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 RECUEIL DES CouRs 451, 496-99 (1952) (anticipatory self-defense permissible, as
long as principles of necessity, proportionality observed); George K. Walker, Information
Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1122-24 (2000); Ruth Wedgwood,
Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 565-66
(1999). My article, George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's
Self-Defense Responses, 37 VALPARAISO L. REV. 489 (2003) [hereinafter Walker, The
Lawfulness], says preemption "seems" equivalent to anticipatory self-defense, citing
contradicting views of the day. Id. at 536. "Seems" is not the same as saying preemption and
prevention are interchangeable, as William C. Bradford, wrote that I said. William C.
Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of
Preemption, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1368 n. 13 (2004). Anticipatory self-defense and
preemption may be the same, as Abraham D. Sofaer thought, and for which my page proofs
cited him. Abraham D. Sofaer, Iraq and International Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at
AI0, cited in Walker, The Lawfulness, supra, at 536 n.198. I also cited Richard Falk to
illustrate an opposing view. Richard Falk, Pre-Emptive War Flagrantly Contradicts the UN's
Legal Framework: Why International Law Matters, THE NATION, Mar. 10, 2003, at 19, 20.
The Valparaiso Law Review editors did not insert my qualifying phrase, "think so" for Sofaer
as I indicated in final page proofs. Letter from George K. Walker to Andre Miksha, Editor-
in-Chief, Valparaiso Law Review (Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with author). In any event I did not
say that preemption and prevention are the same, but tried to present differing sides of a
developing issue not directly relevant to allied and coalition operations in Afghanistan.
Walker, The Lawfulness, supra at 536 & n. 198. The preemption issue will be resolved after a
time of interactive claim and counterclaim, much as the dispute over the territorial sea's
14
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invoked only after an armed attack.' Charter Articles 2(4) and 51 are
as relevant for LOS issues as they are for confrontations entirely on
States' land territory.
Because the Charter requires that U.N. Members agree to carry
out their Charter obligations, 43 a recommendatory Security Council or
General Assembly resolution would almost always have primacy over
a Committee definition,' and certainly if a resolution recites a jus
cogens or customary norm.45  Where a resolution does not restate
positive law, it should still be seriously considered along with
secondary sources like the ABILA LOS Committee research. The
Committee's reported research underscores its recognition of norms
superior to the Charter,' as does UNCLOS:
breadth has been resolved. See Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, 49 AM. J.
INT'L L. 356, 357-58 (1955); supra note 29 and accompanying text,
41. Those arguing that anticipatory self-defense is unlawful in the Charter era include
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 257-61, 275-78, 366-
67 (1963); 1 Simma, supra note 36, at 803-04; ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROCESS AND PROSPECT 32 (1995); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE
159-85 (3d ed. 2001); Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 121-22
(1995) (a change in view from HENKIN, NATIONS, supra note 40, at 143-45, in 1979); PHILIP
C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (1948); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF
LAW ON SEA POWER 83, 171 (1975); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 52aa, at 156 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 126 (1979);
NATALINO RONzirI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND
INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 4 (1985); Tom Farer, Law and War, in 3 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 15, 30, 36-37 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A.
Falk eds., 1971); Yuri M. Kolosov, Limiting the Use of Force: Self-Defense, Terrorism, and
Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE, supra note 40, at 232, 234; Josef L. Kunz, Individual
and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L
L. 872, 878 (1947); Rainer Lagoni, Remarks, Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and the Use
of Force in the Persian Gulf War (Part 1), 82 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 161, 161-62 (1988);
Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and
Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 541 (1999); Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretation of
War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951); see also Robert W.
Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1972)
(states may respond only after being attacked).
42. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
43. U.N. Charter, supra note 35, arts. 2(2), 2(5); see also 1 Simma, supra note 36, at 91-
101, 136-39; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 35, at 40-41, 56-58.
44. See U.N. Charter, supra note 35, arts. 10-11, 13-14, 33, 36-37, 39-41; see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 103(2)(d) reporters' n.2; SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS,
THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 18-20, 266-67 (3d ed. 1998); BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 14; JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 78-79 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); 1 Simma, supra note 36, at 257-87, 298-326,
583-94, 616-43, 717-49; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 35, at 111-29, 133-44, 257-65, 277-87,
290-314; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 1, § 16, at 48-49.
45. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 234.
15
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In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this
Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
47
The foregoing principles for U.N. resolutions should also apply to
pronouncements of other international governmental organizations
whose resolutions apply to the law of the sea, such as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). 48  Mandatory resolutions, such as
Security Council decisions, trump a commentary definition when they
define terms. Non-mandatory resolutions also have primacy when
they restate customary, treaty, or general principles norms. Even
when they do not, they should be considered along with other
secondary sources like the ABILA LOS Committee research. When a
definition emerges from a non-governmental organization (NGO), it
should be given weight according to the principles for the competing
claims of scholars.49 The Committee chose not to define anew terms
already defined in the Convention.50
The Committee has also been sensitive to the possibility of
another definition for a term in law of armed conflict (LOAC)
47. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 301; accord Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 244 (July 8); 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY paras. 87.9(i), 88.1-88.7(d) (Satya N. Nandan et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter 3 COMMENTARY]; see also UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 88; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 8, § 521 cmt. b (citing U.N. Charter art. 2(4) and UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 88, 301
and referring to RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 905 cmt. g); Helsinki Principles, supra note
25, Principle 1.2, at 499, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 25, at 1426; Bernard
H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 814 (1984); John E. Parkerson, Jr., International Legal
Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 MIL. L. REV. 67, 79-85 (1987); Frank
Russo, Targeting Theory in the Law of Naval Warfare, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 8 (1992). See
generally 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 17, paras. 301.1-301.6; Boleslaw A. Boczek, Peaceful
Purposes Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 OCEAN
DEVEL. & INT'L L. 359 (1989).
48. Originally constituted as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), the IMCO is now the IMO, with a different constitutive treaty, different organization
and different procedures, etc. Compare Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization pmbl. Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter
IMCO Convention] , with Amendments to the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization of March 6, 1948, Title of the Convention and Preamble, Nov. 14,
1975, 34 U.S.T. 497, 1276 U.N.T.S. 468 [hereinafter IMO Convention]. There were
amendments to the Convention before and after the 1975 amendments. See 2 MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, supra note 3, at 3, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25; TIF, supra note 15, at 435-36;
CHRISTIAN L. WIKTOR, MULTILATERAL TREATY CALENDAR 1648-1995, at 481 (1998).
49. See supra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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situations, such as when UNCLOS and the 1958 LOS Conventions
declare a separate standard of law through their "other rules"
clauses,51 which traditionally have meant that the 1958 and 1982 law
of the sea treaties are subject to the LOAC in armed conflict
situations.5 2 Since the LOAC, the law of naval warfare and the law of
neutrality in particular, rely in large part on primary sources, (i.e.,
treaties, custom, and general principles) 53 a LOAC-based definition
will have primacy over a Committee definition for the 1982
Convention, although circumstances might call for borrowing an LOS
definition.54 Similarly, self-defense situations might also call for a
different definition that will have primacy because of the status of the
right of individual and collective self-defense as a customary, Charter,
and perhaps jus cogens norm. 55  As in the case of LOAC-governed
situations, however, an LOS-based definition might be borrowed.56
The same principles should apply for definitions in reservations.
UNCLOS does not generally allow reservations, statements, or
51. This clause, sometimes stated slightly differently, appears throughout UNCLOS.
E.g., UNCLOS, supra note 2, pmbl., arts. 2(3) (territorial sea); 19, 21, 31 (territorial sea
innocent passage); 34(2) (straits transit passage); 52(1) (archipelagic sea lanes passage;
incorporation by reference of arts. 19, 21, 31); 58(2), (3) (exclusive economic zone); 78
(continental shelf; coastal State rights do not affect superjacent waters, i.e., territorial or high
seas; coastal State cannot infringe or unjustifiably interfere with "navigation and other rights
and freedoms of other States as provided for in this Convention"); 87(1) (high seas); 138 (the
Area); 293(1) (court or tribunal having jurisdiction for settling disputes must apply UNCLOS
and "other rules of international law not incompatible with [the] Convention"); 303(4)
(archeological, historical objects found at sea, "other international agreements and rules of
international law regarding the protection of objects of an archeological and historical
nature"); id. annex iH, art. 21(1) (prospecting, exploration, and exploitation contracts for the
Area are governed by contract terms, the Area Authority rules, regulations, and procedures of
UNCLOS Part XI, "and other rles of international law not incompatible with" UNCLOS);
annex VI, arts. 23, 38(1) (incorporating UNCLOS art. 293).
52. The Committee settled on a definition for "other rules of international law" that
includes a possibility that the phrase may mean law other than the LOAC, including the law
of neutrality, in some situations. Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 236.
53. See also NWP 1-14M Annotated, supra note 16, at xxxvii-xxxviii. SCHINDLER &
TOMAN, supra note 25, remains the indispensable collection for reprints of these sources.
54. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, paras. 12, 34, 44, 88, 106(c), & cmts.
(application of UNCLOS's "due regard" principle in law of naval warfare situations),
reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 25, at 1157, 1160-61, 1167, 1169 (less
commentaries); see also NWP 1-14M Annotated, supra note 16, para. 8.1.3, at 405-06;
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The "New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea,
68 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 263, 297 (1995) [hereinafter Robertson, The "New"];
Walker, The Tanker, supra note 16, at 536-46; infra Part IH.D (analysis of "due regard" in
UNCLOS).
55. See U.N. Charter, supra note 35, arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 35-36, 39-42
and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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declarations to change Convention rules, except where UNCLOS
specifically permits them.57 For treaties allowing reservations, they
become part of the law of the treaty as much as the primary document,
subject to the rules on multilateral conventions. 58 Therefore, the same
rules that relate to treaty primacy, practice under treaties, and
developing custom should apply to reservations, statements, or
declarations to treaties.59 However, definitions related to reservations,
statements, or declarations can rise no higher than definitions related
to treaty language.
Understandings, statements, or declarations not amounting to
reservations should be on similar footing. When treaties permit
understandings, statements, or declarations not amounting to
reservations, they become part of the law of the treaty as much as the
primary document and should be subject to analogous rules to those
for reservations. 6  Therefore, the same rules relating to treaty
primacy, practice under treaties, and custom and general principles
should apply to properly appended understandings, statements, or
declarations. 61 Definitions so related to the latter can rise no higher
than definitions related to treaty language. An example might be the
definition of "serious" act of pollution in the U.S. understandings and
the ABILA LOS Committee definition in this project.62
A problem that may arise is that no source - a Security Council
decision, other U.N. or other international organizations' resolutions,
a jus cogens norm, a primary source, a reservation if permitted by a
treaty, an understanding, declaration, or statement if permitted by a
treaty, or secondary sources - may offer guidance. It is here that the
quality of the Committee analysis is critical. Hopefully, the
Committee research and comment process will produce definitions to
57. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 309-10; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text.
58. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, arts. l(d), 19-23; see also supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
60. My article, George K. Walker, Professionals' Definitions and States' Interpretative
Declarations (Understandings, Statements or Declarations) for the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention (forthcoming 2006), analyzes these issues in greater depth than is possible here;
see also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
62. Compare Text, supra note 9, § 3(l 1)(D), with Walker, Definitions 111, supra note
19, at 259.
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fill these kinds of voids 63 as well as add context to situations where
there are definitions available in other, perhaps senior, sources.
III. ADDITIONAL PROPOSED DEFINITIONS FOR THE 1982 LAW OF THE
SEA CONVENTION
Seven new terms were proposed for definition in 2004:
appropriate international organization or appropriate international
organizations (plural); associated or dependent species; competent
international organization or competent international organizations
(plural); due regard; maximum sustainable yield; optimum utilization;
and regional or subregional organization. 64 The same procedure,
format, and limitations for previous drafts, such as not attempting to
redefine terms that UNCLOS already defines, will be followed for
these terms.65 If there are no objections or corrections other than
typographical errors and the like, it is proposed that these terms be
integrated into a Tentative Final Draft, to include all terms the
Committee has considered.66
A. "Appropriate international organization" or "appropriate
international organizations."
1. Discussion and analysis. UNCLOS, Article 64(1), refers to
"appropriate international organizations" in the plural and to
"appropriate international organization" in the singular:
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the
region for the highly migratory species listed in Annex I [of the
Convention] shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region,
both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for
which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State
and other States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall
cooperate to establish such an organization and participate in its work.67
63. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
64. See Schiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
65. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 218-20.
66. See id. at 228-69, Walker & Noyes, Definitions !1, supra note 19, at 223-309, and
Walker & Noyes, Definitions I, supra note 19, at 349-66, for these terms.
67. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 64(1).
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UNCLOS, Article 65, also refers to "appropriate international
organization" in the singular:
Nothing in this Part [V of the Convention] restricts the right of a
coastal State or the competence of an international organization, as
appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine
mammals more strictly than provided in this Part. States shall cooperate
with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of
cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international
organizations for their conservation, management and study.
68
UNCLOS, Article 143(3)(b) refers to "other international
organizations as appropriate":
3. States parties may carry out marine scientific research in the Area.
States Parties shall promote international cooperation in marine scientific
research in the area by:
(b) ensuring that programs are developed through the Authority or
other international organizations as appropriate for the benefit of
developing States and technologically less developed states with a view
to:
(i) strengthening their research capabilities;
(ii) training their personnel and the personnel of the Authority in the
techniques and applications of research;
(iii) fostering the employment of their qualified personnel in research
in the Area ... 69
UNCLOS, Article 297(3)(d), referring to disputes referred to
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions and limitations and
exceptions to these procedures, provides that "[t]he report of the
conciliation commission shall be communicated to the appropriate
international organizations."70 UNCLOS, Annex VIII, Article 3(e),
referring to special arbitration procedures for fisheries, environmental
protection, marine scientific research, or navigation issues, refers to
"appropriate international organization" in providing:
For the purposes of proceedings under this Annex, the special arbitral
tribunal shall, unless the parties otherwise agree, be constituted as follows:
(e) Unless the parties agree that the appointment be made by a person
or a third State chosen by the parties, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall make the necessary appointments within 30 days of receipt
68. Id. art. 65.
69. Id. art. 143(3).
70. Id. art. 297(3).
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of a request under subparagraphs (c) and (d) [of Article 3]. The
appointments referred to in this subparagraph shall be made from the
appropriate list or lists of experts referred to in [A]rticle 2 of this Annex
and in consultation with the parties to the dispute and the appropriate
international organization. The members so appointed shall be of
different nationalities and may not be in the service of, ordinarily resident
in the territory of, or nationals of, any of the parties to the dispute.
7 1
Commentary for Article 64 suggests that "appropriate
international organization" might mean the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), one of its regional fishery bodies, or fishery
organizations not affiliated with the FAO like the International
Commission for Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).72
Commentary for Article 65 says:
There is no indication of what constitutes a competent international
organization in these matters. Special arrangements regarding the
conservation and utilization of whales in particular have been established
under the International Whaling Commission. Failure to conserve stocks
has also led to the application of other conventions to cetaceans.
7 3
Article 297 preparatory works show this formula in a compromise
draft for what became Article 297(d)(e): "The report of the
conciliation commission shall be communicated to the appropriate
global, regional or sub-regional intergovernmental organizations."7 4
UNCLOS, Article 63 refers to "appropriate subregional or regional
organizations" in relation to "associated" species.75
A definition for "dependent" or "associated" species is proposed
in Part III.B. A definition for "competent international organization"
or "competent international organizations" is proposed in Part III.C.
A definition for "regional" or "sub-regional" organization is proposed
in Part III.G.
2. Comments. Howard S. Schiffman proposed the terms
"appropriate international organization" or "appropriate international
organizations. '7 6 The Chair researched the terms.
3. Conclusions. This definition for "appropriate international
organization" or "appropriate international organizations" is proposed:
71. Id. annex VIII, art. 3.
72. See 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
para. 64.9(c) (Satya N. Nandan et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 2 COMMENTARY].
73. Id. para. 65.11(b).
74. 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 17, para. 297.15(d).
75. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 63.
76. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
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"Appropriate international organization" or "appropriate international
organizations," as used in the 1982 LOS Convention, means that
international organization or those international organizations typically
associated by principles, purposes and functions with action required by a
particular article of the Convention or its Annexes. The appropriate
organization may be global, regional or sub-regional, depending on the
circumstances of the particular issue, and may be an intergovernmental
organization (IGO) organized pursuant to the U.N. Charter, an
independent IGO, or a nongovernmental organization (NGO).
These proposed general definitions, which observers may rightly
characterize as almost no definitions at all, follow from UNCLOS's
relatively scant preparatory works and from practical necessity.
For example, the FAO, cited in commentary for Article 64, 77 is
organized under the Charter.78 Article 64 commentary adds that IGOs
subordinate to and independent from the FAO or were also
considered. 79 The FAO Committee on Fisheries has been
the only intergovernmental forum in which fishery problems are examined
periodically on a worldwide basis, and could, in some respects, be
considered a global organization to which article 61 refers. Alongside this
Commission [sic], there are a number of regional fishery bodies both
inside and outside FAO, the activities of which are of more direct
relevance to the actual management of fishery resources.
80
Article 65 commentary, mentioning the International Whaling
81Commission, is generic in its discussion, leading to the conclusion
that its drafters did not intend a specific international organization.82
The same can be said for the Article 297 preparatory works.83 As an
introductory commentary put it: "[i]t will usually appear from the
77. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 64.9(c).
78. Constitution of United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Oct. 16, 1945,
60 Stat. 1886. There have been many amendments to the FAO Constitution. See Constitution
of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Oct. 16, 1945, 12 U.S.T. 980
(composite text as amended to 1957); TIF, supra note 15, at 421-22; WIKTOR, supra note 48,
at 440-41.
79. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 64.9(c).
80. Id. para. 61.12(e).
81. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 3, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (establishing the International Whaling Commission). The
Convention has been amended often. See TIF, supra note 15, at 525; WIKTOR, supra note 48,
at 461.
82. See 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 65.11(b) ("in particular," "other
conventions").
83. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 17, paras. 297.1-297.19.
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context of the issue involved which international organization is
competent for that particular purpose. '
The practicality aspect of the proposed definition is that
international organizations, whether organized and operating under
the Charter or organized and operating independently outside the
Charter umbrella as an IGO or an NGO, can change in function or
organization or disappear, perhaps to be replaced by other
organization or organizations. The International Maritime
Organization (IMO) is a case in point. Originally organized as the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the
IMCO is now the IMO, with a different constitutive treaty, different
organization, and different procedures.85 If a definition would have
named the IMCO as the "appropriate international organization" in
1948 when the IMCO Convention was signed, well before 1982, when
the 1975 name change became effective,86 the result might have been
confusion, since the IMCO remained in existence for some states
during the transition, and the IMO was the IGO for other situations. 87
This is a simplistic example; more fundamental issues can arise if, for
example, an international organization "appropriate" at one time under
UNCLOS changes its functions, while retaining its name, so that it is
no longer "appropriate." To name organizations thought "appro-
priate" invites almost instant obsolescence of a definition. Moreover,
as the Article 64 and 65 commentary suggests, the Convention
negotiators obviously had different international organizations in mind
for different purposes of different UNCLOS provisions.
In LOAC-governed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
may apply. 88 The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or ifjus cogens norms apply.89
84. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. INTRO.27.
85. Compare IMCO Convention, supra note 48, pmbl., with IMO Convention, supra
note 48, Title of the Convention and Preamble. There were amendments to the Convention
before and after the 1975 amendments. See 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 3, at 3,
11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25; TIF, supra note 15, at 435-36; WIKTOR, supra note 48, at 481.
86. TIF, supra note 15, at 436 n.*; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
89. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56 and
accompanying text.
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B. "Associated" or "dependent" species.
1. Discussion and analysis. The phrases "associated species" and
"associated or dependent species" are in UNCLOS, Article 61(4),
dealing with conservation of living resources in the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ):
In taking .uch [coastal State-ensured proper conservation and
management "1 measures the coastal State shall take into consideration the
effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species
with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or
dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become
seriously threatened.9 1
The phrase "associated species" is in UNCLOS, Article 63, also
dealing with the EEZ:
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within
the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these states
shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and
ensure the conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice
to the other provisions of this Part [V, provisions for the EEZ].
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both
within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to
the zone, the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the
adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional
or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the
conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.92
The phrase "associated or dependent species" is also in UNCLOS,
Article 119, dealing with conservation of high seas living resources:
1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other
conservation measures for the living resources in the high seas, States
shall:
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or
dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring
populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at which
their reproduction may become seriously threatened.93
Article 61, tracing its origin from Articles 1(2) and 2 of the 1958
Fishing Convention, "formulates the rights and duties" of coastal
90. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 61(2).
91. Id. art. 61(4).
92. Id. art. 63.
93. Id. art. 119.
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states with respect to the EEZ; Article 63 sets out part of the scope of
those rights and duties.94 Article 119 serves the same function as
Article 61 does for the high seas and should be read together with
Article 118's requirement that states cooperate in conserving and
maintaining high seas living resources.95 Though preparatory works
and commentary on Articles 61, 63 and 119 say little about the
definition of "associated" or "dependent" species, the phrases are
related to interdependence of species:
[Article 61(4)] deals with one aspect of the interdependence of fish stocks
in relation to the conservation of the living resources. It obligates the
coastal State to take into consideration the effects mentioned. It is not,
however, limited to that; there is interdependence with other species,
especially marine mammals. Identical language is used in [A]rticle 119,
paragraph 1(b).96
Commentary on Article 119 has the same theme. 97  A general
proposed definition for Articles 61, 63 and 119, should focus on
general interdependence of species, with particular reference to
marine mammals. For example, the definition should contemplate
known food chains among and between fish stocks to be conserved
and other species of living resources of the seas.
2. Comments. Howard S. Schiffman proposed the terms
"associated" or "dependent" species. 98 The Chair researched the term.
3. Conclusions. This definition for "associated" or "dependent"
species is proposed:
"Associated" or "dependent" species, as used in the 1982 LOS
Convention, arts. 61, 63 and 119, means species interdependent with fish
stocks, including marine mammals interdependent with fish and other
stocks, for example species that interlock among and between fish and
other stocks to be conserved, such as the food chain among stocks and
other species.
In LOAC-govemed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
94. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras. 61.1-61.2.
95. 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, para. 119.7(a).
96. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 61.12(i).
97. Compare id. with 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, paras. 119.7(b), 119.7(d).
98. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
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may apply.99 The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or if jus cogens norms apply.' o
C. "Competent international organization" or "competent
international organizations."
1. Discussion and analysis. The phrases "competent international
organization" or "competent international organizations" appear in 9
of 17 Parts of UNCLOS: Article 22(3)(a), Part II, Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone;'0' Articles 41(4)-(5), Part III, Straits Used for
International Navigation;10 2 Article 53(9), Part IV, Archipelagic
States;0 3 Articles 60(3)-61(5), Part V, EEZ;' ° Article 119(2), Part
VII, High Seas; 0 5 Articles 197-223, Part XII, Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment;"° Articles 238-65, Part XIII,
Marine Scientific Research (MSR);0 7 Articles 266(1)-78, Part XIV,
Development and Transfer of Marine Technology; 08  Article
297(1)(c), Part XV, Settlement of Disputes; ° and Article 3(2), Annex
II Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf."0 Among the
1958 LOS Conventions, the phrase "competent international
organizations" only appears in the High Seas Convention, Article 25:
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from
the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards
and regulations which may be formulated by the competent
international organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international
organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the
99. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
100. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56
and accompanying text.
101. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 23(3)(a).
102. Id. arts. 41(4)-(5).
103. Id. art. 53(9).
104. Id. arts. 60(3), 60(5), 61(2), 61(5).
105. Id. art. 119(2).
106. Id. arts. 197-202, 204(1), 205, 207(4), 208(5), 210(4), 211(l)-(3), 211(5)-
211 (6)(a), 212(3), 213-214, 216(1), 217(1), 217(4), 217(7), 218(1), 220(7), 222-223.
107. Id. arts. 238-239, 242(1), 243-244(2), 246(3), 246(5), 246(5)(d), 248, 249(1), 251-
252, 252(b), 253(l)(b), 253(4)-(5), 254(1)-(4), 256-257, 262-263(3), 265.
108. Id. arts. 266(1), 268-269, 271-273, 275(1)-276(1), 278.
109. Id. art. 297(l)(c).
110. Id. annex l1, art. 3(2).
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seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radio-active
materials or other harmful agents."'
Review of commentaries on these provisions reveals different
international organizations are considered the "competent
international organization[s]" for different articles. The generic
meaning for "international organization" is not clear; a proposal to
define "international organization" as an intergovernmental
organization, following the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
definition, was not adopted. 2
The meaning of the plural expression will clearly be dependent upon time,
place and circumstance (an observation equally applicable to the singular
expression in [A]rticle 223). It also allows States to interact with different
international intergovernmental organizations in given circumstances.
The meaning of the singular expression, however, is more circumscribed.
In dealing with applicable rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures, the expression "the competent international organization"
is frequently encountered in articles adopted by the both the Second
Committee and the Third Committee, [dealing with navigation and safety
rules], and this normally refers to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). Elsewhere in the Convention, however, the singular expression
refers to whichever international organization is competent in the
circumstances. It was generally understood in the [Law of the Sea]
Conference, in both the Second Committee and the Third Committee, that
the IMO is "the competent international organization" with regard to the
prevention, reduction and control of vessel-source pollution ... ; dumping
at sea; the safety of navigation and routeing systems; and the design,
construction, equipment and manning of vessels. Similarly the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent
international organization with respect to radioactive substances. 113
111. High Seas Convention, supra note 15, art. 25.
112. 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
para. XII.17 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter 4 COMMENTARY] (referring to
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(i)).
113. Id. (footnotes omitted) (inter alia citing Statute of International Atomic Energy
Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3). The IMO "has a wide competence in
matters affecting shipping and has adopted a detailed and technical approach to its work. Its
committees ... have played a prominent role in drawing up regulations concerning navigation
and pollution." CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 23. Over 40 IMO-drafted treaties and
protocols, many widely accepted by states, are in force. See generally id. at 264-77, 333,
339-56; 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 771-80, 831-37, 997-1015
(I.A. Shearer ed., 1984) [hereinafter 2 O'CONNELL]. The IAEA sponsored the Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1977 U.N.T.S. 266. CHURCHILL & LOWE,
supra note 2, at 23, 362-63.
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Commentaries on specific UNCLOS provisions bear out this general
statement. 1 14
"The IMO is recognized as the only international organization
responsible for establishing and adopting measures on an international
level concerning the routeing of ships" in territorial sea innocent
passage," 5 the subject of Article 22(3)(a)." 6  The same is true for
routing systems designated by IMO for straits transit passage, the
subject of Articles 41(4)-41(5)," 1 and for archipelagic sea lanes
passage, where IMO designates sea lanes and routes, the subject of
Article 53(9).118 For aircraft exercising rights of archipelagic
overflight, Article 53(9) does not apply; the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Rules of the Air apply to these
flights." 9 The IMO is also recognized as the competent international
organization for Articles 60(3) and 60(5),120 dealing with removing
artificial islands, installations and structures, and safety zones around
them. 2' UNCLOS, Article 208, which requires coastal states to
"adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment," refers to Article 60.122 UNCLOS, Article
246(5)(c), which addresses EEZ and continental shelf MSR, also
refers to Article 60.123
114. In addition to UNCLOS, to the extent merchant ship crews' working conditions
affect navigational safety, International Labor Organization-sponsored treaties could have an
impact. CHURCHILL& LowE, supra note 2, at 270; 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 113, at 831.
115. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 22.8(d); see also CHURCHILL & LowE, supra
note 2, at 95 n.59. The non-suspendable innocent passage regime of arts. 17-32, and therefore
the IMO as the competent international organization to establish and adopt sea lanes, applies
to straits used for international navigation but excluded from straits transit passage under
UNCLOS, Article 38(1), or those straits used for international navigation between a part of
the high seas or an EEZ and a foreign State's territorial sea; cf 2 COMMENTARY, supra note
72, paras. 45.1, 45.8(a)-45.8(c).
116. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 22(3).
117. Id. art. 41; 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 41.9(c).
118. Id. art. 53; CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 2, at 106, 108, 127-28 (IMO the
competent international organization); 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras. 53.1, 53.9(k).
119. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 53.9(k); see also CHURCHILL & LowE, supra
note 2, at 173-74.
120. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 60.15(0; see id. para. 60.15(h); see also
CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 2, at 155, 167-68, 170.
121. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 60.
122. Id. art 208; 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 60.15(l); 4 COMMENTARY, supra
note 112, para. 208.10(a).
123. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 246; 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 60.15(m).
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On the other hand, commentators note the different thrust of
Articles 61(2) and 61(5),24 dealing with "competent international
organizations, whether subregional, regional or global," for
conservation and management measures and exchange of available
scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data
relevant to conserving fish stocks:
In paragraph 2, the expression "competent international organization,
whether subregional, regional or global" must be carefully distinguished
from the expression "competent international organization" used in the
articles ... relating to navigation and protection and preservation of the
marine environment. In those provisions, the expression normally refers
to the [IMO]. . . . In dealing with the harmonization of references to
subregional, regional and global organizations ..... "except with respect to
article 61," the term "competent international organizations" is sufficient
to refer to global organizations or to both global and other organizations..
The [FAO] is not in the same position with respect to fisheries[,
conservation of which is within the ambit of Article 61]. The FAO
Committee on Fisheries constitute[d, in 1993] the only intergovernmental
forum in which fishery problems are examined periodically on a
worldwide basis, and could, in some respects, be considered a global
organization to which article 61 refers. Alongside this Commission, there
are a number of regional fishery bodies both inside and outside FAO, the
activities of which are of more direct relevance to the actual management
of fishery resources. 1
25
UNCLOS, Article 119(2)'s similar reference to "competent
international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global,"
in the context of high seas conservation of living resources, 126 must be
read in the same light as the references in Articles 61(2) and 61(5); in
other words, the primary reference should be to the FAO, along with
regional fishery bodies inside and outside FAO. 1 7
There are more references to "the competent international
organization" or "competent international organizations" in UNCLOS
Part XII, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, than
any other Part of the Convention. 28 First, as a general matter, Part XII
124. "What is much less certain is whether the coastal State's fishery management
duties... in articles 61 and 62 have become part of customary law." CHURCHILL & LOWE,
supra note 2, at 290.
125. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 61.12(e) (citations omitted); see also id.
para. 61.12(j); cf. CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 2, at 294-96.
126. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 119(2).
127. See 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras. 61.12(e), 61.12(j), 61.12(k); cf.
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 297-305, 313; 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, para.
119.7(e).
128. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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references to "competent international organizations" include global
organizations or global and other organizations. 129 Second, however,
if the singular "competent international organization" is used, the
IMO has been considered "the competent international organization"
with regard to prevention, reduction, and control of vessel-source
pollution; dumping at sea; safety of navigation and routing systems;
and design, construction, equipment and manning of vessels. 130 The
IAEA has been considered "the competent international organization"
with respect to radioactive substances.' 3
The first is true for references to "competent international
organizations," in the plural, in UNCLOS Article 197 commentary
that mentions the IMO but does not exclude other organizations. 13 2
The same drafting pattern for "competent international organizations"
appears in commentaries for UNCLOS Articles 198, 199, 200, 201,
204(1), 205 and 214,133 but not in those for Articles 202, 210(4),
212(3), 216 and 222, and indirectly in Articles 207, 208 and 213
commentaries. "3 Article 200 commentary refers to the IMO and other
organizations. 135  Article 212 commentary regarding atmospheric
pollution refers to the ICAO.13 6
UNCLOS Articles 211(1), 211(2), 211(3), 211(5), and 211(6)(a),
by contrast, refer to "the competent international organization" in the
singular, " "the" organization meaning the IMO:
only one international intergovernmental organization - the International
Maritime Organization - is competent for . . . establishing international
rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from vessels, and for adopting, where appropriate, routeing
systems designed to minimize the threat of accidents which might cause
pollution of the marine environment.
138
However,
129. See 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. X11.17, at 16.
130. Id. para. XII.17, at 15.
131. Id. para. XII.17; see also CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 2, at 333, 339-70, 394-
96 ("The treaties concerned with pollution from ships were all adopted under the auspices of
the [IMO] .... ").
132. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 197.7 ("global or other organizations").
133. Id. paras. 198.1, 199.1, 199.4-199.5, 200.6, 201.5, 204.7, 205.5, 214.7(a).
134. Compare id. para. 207.4 with id. para. 207.5; see id. para. 208.10(e) (referring to
id. para. 207.5); id. para. 213.7(f) (referring to id. para. 207.7(d)).
135. Id. para. 200.1 (referring inter alia to IMCO, FAO).
136. Id. paras. 212.9(b)-212.9(c).
137. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 211(1)-(3), 211(5), 21 l(6)(a).
138. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 211.15(d).
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Regional organizations, whose specific competence in the part of the sea
concerned is generally acknowledged and recognized, especially by the
flag State, and whose decisions are compatible with the Convention, could
assist in the implementation of the international rules and standards, the
elaboration of regional rules and standards and the establishment of
regional monitoring systems, the dissemination of information and the
promotion of technical cooperation.
1 39
Similarly, commentary for UNCLOS Article 217, referring thrice to
"the competent international organization,"'14 says the IMO is the
organization that establishes international rules and standards for
vessel compliance with marine environmental pollution standards.
14 1
Article 218 commentary, also referring to "the competent international
organization," does not elucidate the rationale, however.' 42 Article
220(7), by referring to "the competent international organization or as
otherwise agreed,"' 43 suggests cooperation "not only with IMO but
also with [FAO] and the bodies associated with it."'"
Although UNCLOS Article 223 refers to "the competent
international organization,"' 141 that reference "does not imply that in
principle only one international organization can be competent for the
purposes of . . . [A]rticle [223]. It refers to that international
organization which was the competent one for the purposes of that
provision of the Convention on the basis of which the proceedings
were instituted." 146
Thus, although there seems to be no negotiating history or
commentary for a few UNCLOS Part XII provisions, data from the
rest confirms the view that "the competent international organization"
means the IMO and only the IMO, except in Article 220(7), where the
qualifying phrase, "or as otherwise agreed," signals a possibility of
cooperation with other international organizations. Article 223
documentation, dealing with enforcement,147 indicates UNCLOS
negotiators did not mean to confine the meaning of "the competent
139. Id. See generally id. paras. 211.2 (regarding the IMCO's earlier work), 211.15(g)
(regarding the IMO's contact with States).
140. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 217.
141. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 217.8(b).
142. See id. paras. 218.1-218.7.
143. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 220(7).
144. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 220.1; see also id. para. 220.1 l(k).
145. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 223.
146. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 223.9(a). The IMO was reported to have
considered "the need for special procedures for submitting evidence by the IMO in
proceedings under... [A]rticle [223]." Id.
147. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 223.
31
Walker: Defining Terms in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention IV: The Last
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
164 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
international organization" to IMO. For the phrase "competent
international organizations" in Part XII, it seems reasonably clear that
regional and sub-regional organizations are also meant.
There are equally as many references to "competent international
organization" or "competent international organizations" in UNCLOS
Part XIII, providing for MSR. The Part XII pattern of definition'48 for
"competent international organizations" continues in Part XIII. They
can include governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Part
XIII's use of the term "refer[s] to whichever organization or
organizations are conducting marine scientific research." 14 9
UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)
works with many such organizations, including working with the FAO
on fisheries, the IAEA on protecting the marine environment, the
IHO, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) on ocean monitoring and
marine pollution research and monitoring, regional groups like the
Comision Permanente del Pacifico Sur and the International
Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea,
and NGOs like the International Council for the Exploration of the
Seas and the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research, which is part
of the International Council of Scientific Unions.150 Commentaries for
Articles 238,' 243,152 244,153 251,15' 252,155 256,156 257,157 261,158 and
148. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
149. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. XIH.14.
150. Id.; see also CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 2, at 412, 415-19.
151. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 238.1 l(c) (listing the International Sea-Bed
Authority, whose "competence is unequivocally established in UNCLOS art. 143," the United
Nations and its competent specialized agencies, the IAEA, the IOC, UNEP, and the
possibility of NGOs).
152. Id. para. 243.7(b).
153. See id. paras. 244.4-244.6.
154. See id. para. 251.4 ("There is no indication of which organizations are 'competent'
in this matter, but the [IOC] plays leading role in the implementation of article 251 .").
155. Cf id. para. 252.9(a).
156. Id. para. 256.7(c) (noting that the reference to "competent international
organizations" indicates that art. 256 applies to "any and all such organizations wishing to
conduct [MSR] in maritime zones beyond national jurisdictional limits that are capable of
doing so").
157. See id. para. 257.6(b) & n.2 (referencing WMO programs).
158. Id. para. 261.5 n.2. The IMO Secretariat "has expressed the opinion that [the]
'IMO would appear to be the most appropriate body for developing the international rules and
standards to ensure safety at sea"' and that it should consult with the ICAO, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the IOC, the IHO, and other organizations. Id. (both
citing and quoting INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, LEG/MISC/I, IMPLICATIONS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982 FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
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2621 9  underscore the possible diversity of organizations.
Commentaries for Articles 239, 242(1), 246, 248, 249(1), 253, 254
and 263 lack similar references; 16° however, given these articles'
provenance within Part XIII's context,' 61 where other commentaries
note the variety of organizations that can participate, the same
meaning for "competent international organizations" should attach to
Articles 239, 242(1), 246, 248, 249(1), 253, 254 and 263.
Article 265 lacks the article "the" before "competent international
organization." '162  There is no commentary on the omission; 163 since
Article 265 refers to "the State or competent international organization
authorized to conduct a marine scientific research project,"'" Article
265's context 165 suggests that "competent international organization"
in Article 265 does not mean the IMO as in other contexts, 166 but
rather a particular international organization, whether global, regional
or subregional, involved in an MSR project and subject to Article 265
interim measures issues.
Commentaries to UNCLOS, Part XIV, Development and Transfer
of Marine Technology, follow the pattern of Parts XII and XIII for
defining "competent international organizations." Commentaries to
Articles 266(1), 167 268,168 269,169 272,170 273,'17 276,172 and 278173 note
MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) para. 127 (1987), reprinted in 3 NETH. INST. FOR THE LAW
OF THE SEA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTARY
YEARBOOK 1987, 340, 388).
159. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, paras. 261.5 n.2 , 262.5 & n.3 (air safety under
ICAO; safety at sea under IMO; internationally agreed warning signals under ITU); see also
supra note 158.
160. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, paras. 239.1-239.4, 242.1-242.10(d), 256.1-
256.17(e), 248.1-248.8(h), 249.1-249.12(j), 253.1-253.13(t), 254.1-254.14(g), 263.1-263.8.
161. The Vienna Convention declares that a treaty must "be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(1). See
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 325(1); AUST, supra note 8, at 187-91 (art. 31[1] recites
basic rule, Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31(2) context principles for law of treaties); HORN,
supra note 8, § 25.7, at 261-62; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, §
632, at 1271-75; MCNAIR, supra note 8, at 364-68, 380-81, 385; Kearney & Dalton, supra
note 32, at 519-21.
162. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 265.
163. See 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 265.1-265.3.
164. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 265.
165. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(1); see also supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 115-23, 129-46 and accompanying text.
167. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 266.7(a) (noting that the phrase is "broad
enough to embrace any international intergovernmental organization which is competent to
render the requested assistance, whether by virtue of its general characteristics and sphere of
activity, or... its regional association").
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the variety of possible organizations. Commentaries for Articles 271
and 275 lack similar references;174 however, given these provisions'
provenance within Part XIV's context,175  where other articles'
commentaries note the variety of organizations that can participate,
the same meaning for "competent international organizations" should
attach to Articles 271 and 275.
Article 297(l)(c), in UNCLOS Part XV, Settlement of Disputes,
refers to "a competent international organization."' 176 There appears to
be no commentary on this. 177  However, Article 297(1)(c) refers to
"specified international rules and standards for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to the
coastal State and which have been established . . . through a
competent international organization . . . in accordance with this
Convention."'' 78  Under UNCLOS Part XII, Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment, when "the competent
international organization" is used, IMO is considered "the competent
international organization" for prevention, reduction and control of
vessel-source pollution; dumping at sea; safety of navigation and
routing systems; and design, construction, equipment and manning of
168. Id. para. 268.5(e) (referencing the IMO's steps to implement art. 268(d).
169. See id. paras. 269.2-269.3 (suggesting that "competent international organizations"
is a shorthand version of "cooperation at the international, regional and sub-regional levels").
170. See id. paras. 272.1-272.2 (suggesting that "competent international organizations"
is a shorthand version of "organizations . . . in the field of transfer of technology . . .co-
ordinat[ing] . . . any regional or international programmes"). UNCLOS art. 272 says that
states "shall endeavour to ensure that competent international organizations coordinate their
activities, including any regional or global programmes .... " UNCLOS, supra note 2, art.
272.
171. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 273.9(e) ("'[C]ompetent international
organization' refers to any international organization which is competent in the circumstances
present; in Part XIV, however, it does not have the same specific connotation that it has in
Part XII.").
172. See id. paras. 276.5-276.6 (suggesting that "competent international organizations"
is a shorthand version of "competent regional organizations, [and] international
organizations").
173. Id. para. 278.4(a) ("Article 278 is addressed to 'competent international
organizations,' both those referred to in Part XIII (articles 238 to 265) as well as those in Part
XIV. It is not possible to indicate in general terms the competent international organizations
which the article has in mind . .
174. See id. paras. 271.1-271.4, 275.1-275.4(b).
175. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(1); see also supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
176. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 297(l)(c).
177. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 297.12.
178. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 297(1)(c).
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vessels. 179 The IAEA is considered the "competent international
organization" for radioactive substances. 8 ' Since Article 297 refers to
protection and preservation of the marine environment, and UNCLOS
Part XII commentaries accord a meaning to "the competent
international organization," logically "a competent international
organization" in Article 297(1)(c) should have the same meaning as
"the competent international organization" in Part XII.
UNCLOS Annex II, Article 3(2) allows the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf to cooperate with the IOC, IHO and
"other competent international organizations."' 181  Article 3(2)
commentary does not say whether "other" organizations might include
regional, subregional, or nongovernmental organizations.' 82 However,
given the apparent construction of "the competent international
organizations" as including these, it would be consistent to accord the
same definition to Article 3(2).
Definitions for "appropriate international organization" or
"appropriate international organizations" are proposed in Part III.A.
A definition for "regional" or "sub-regional" organization is proposed
in Part III.G.
2. Comments. Howard S. Schiffman proposed the terms
"competent international organization" or "competent international
organizations."' 83 The Chair researched the terms.
3. Conclusions. These definitions for "competent international
organization" or "competent international organizations" are
proposed:
"The competent international organization," as used in the 1982 LOS
Convention, arts. 22, 41, and 60, means the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) or its successor. "The competent international
organization," as used in the Convention, art. 53, means the IMO or its
successor with respect to ships' navigation, and the International Civil
Aviation Organization or its successor with respect to overflight.
"The competent international organization," as used in the
Convention, Part XII, means the IMO or its successor with respect to
issues of preventing, reducing and controlling vessel-source pollution;
dumping at sea; safety of navigation and routing systems; and design,
construction, equipment and manning of vessels. The International
Atomic Energy Agency or its successor is "the competent international
organization" with respect to issues involving radioactive substances.
179. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 113, 131, 150-51 and accompanying text.
181. UNCLOS, supra note 2, annex II, art. 3(2).
182. See 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. A.lI.10(c).
183. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
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In the Convention, art. 220(7), because of the qualifying clause,
"unless otherwise agreed," that follows "the international organization,"
other international organizations may be involved.
In the Convention, art. 223, "the international organization" means
that international organization which is the competent one for the purposes
of art. 223, on the basis of which proceedings were instituted.
In the Convention, art. 265, "competent international organization" does
not necessarily mean the IMO or its successor, but rather a particular
international organization, global, regional, or subregional, involved in a
marine scientific research project and subject to art. 265 interim measures
issues.
"A competent international organization," as used in the Convention,
art. 297, has the same meaning as "the competent international
organization" in the Convention, Part XII.
"Competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional
orglobal," as used in the Convention, arts. 61 and 119, means the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as the "global" organization, or its
successor; "subregional" or "regional" organizations mean subregional or
regional fishery bodies, whether they are subject to FAO or its successor
or independent of FAO or its successor.
"Competent international organizations," as used in the Convention,
Parts XII, XIII and XIV and Annex II, art. 3(2), means global, regional,
and subregional international organizations.
The phrase "or its successor" accounts for a possibility, however
remote, that IMO, FAO or other organizations may change in
purposes, principles and functions, so that another international
organization would be considered "the international organization" in
the future.
In LOAC-governed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
may apply."1  The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or ifjus cogens norms apply. 185
D. "Due regard."
1. Discussion and analysis. The phrase "due regard" appears in
UNCLOS, Articles 27(4), 39(3)(a), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a),
79(5), 87(2), 142(1), 148, 161(4), 162(2)(d), 163(2), 167(2), 234, and
267 and in Appendixes II, Article 2(1) and IV, Articles 5(1) and
5(2).186 Article 87(2) declares that the high seas freedoms listed in
184. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
185. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56
and accompanying text.
186. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 27(4), 39(3)(a), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a), 79(5),
87(2), 142(1), 148, 161(4), 162(2)(d), 163(2), 167(2), 234, 267; id. appendix H, art. 2(1); id.
appendix IV, arts. 51(l)-(2).
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Article 87(1) (inter alia freedoms of navigation, overflight, fishing
(subject to Articles 116-20), and scientific research (subject to Parts
VI and XIII, governing MSR) and freedoms to lay submarine cables
and pipelines (subject to UNCLOS Part VI, governing the continental
shelf) and to construct artificial islands and other installations
permitted under international law (subject to Part V)'187 "shall be
exercised by all States with due regard of the interests of other States
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due
regard for the rights under [the] Convention with respect to activities
in the Area."' 8  This UNCLOS due regard rule applies, under
Convention Articles 1(1), 3, 33, 55, 58, 76(1), 78, 121, and 135 to
high seas areas claimed by coastal states as part of their contiguous
zones, continental shelves or EEZs, or those high seas otherwise under
Area cognizance, except as otherwise governed by the Convention
(e.g., in Articles 56(3), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a), 142(1), 148, and 234).189
The High Seas Convention, Article 2, similarly listing high seas
freedoms, declares that they "shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas."'190 The High Seas Convention
reasonable regard rule applies, under Article 24 of the Territorial Sea
Convention, Article 3 of the Shelf Convention, and Article 1 of the
Fishing Convention, to high seas areas claimed by a coastal state as
part of its contiguous zone, continental shelf, or fishery zone.' 9' The
Convention on International Civil Aviation requires states parties,
when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, to have "due regard"
for civil aircraft navigation safety. 192
Commentary for UNCLOS, Article 87(2) explains "due regard":
[T]he requirement of "due regard" is a qualification of the rights of States
in exercising the freedoms of the high seas. The standard of "due regard"
requires all States, in exercising their high seas freedoms, to be aware of
and consider the interests of other States in using the high seas, and to
187. Id. art. 87(l).
188. Id. art. 87(2).
189. Cf 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, para. 87.9(m).
190. High Seas Convention, supra note 15; see also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.),
1974 I.C.J. 3, 22, 29 (July 25, 1974) (holding that art. 2 and the rest of the High Seas
Convention are generally declaratory of established principles of international law); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 521(3), 514 reporters' n.3.
191. See Shelf Convention, supra note 15, art. 3; Fishing Convention, supra note 15,
art. 1(1); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 15, art. 24(1).
192. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3(d), Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 521 cmt. d.
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refrain from activities that interfere with the exercise by other States of the
freedom of the high seas. As the ILC[, which prepared drafts of the 1958
LOS Conventions,] stated in its Commentary in 1956, "States are bound to
refrain from any acts that might adversely affect the use of the high seas
by nationals of other States." The construction in paragraph 2 recognizes
that all States have the right to exercise high seas freedoms, and balances
consideration for the rights and interests of all states in this regard.'
93
Article 87(2)'s "due regard" formulation evolved from the High
Seas Convention, Article 2 "reasonable regard" language, through an
intermediate draft phrase of "due consideration."'' 94
UNCLOS Article 79(5) requires that states laying submarine
cables or pipelines "shall have due regard to cables or pipelines
already in position."' 95 The High Seas Convention, Article 26(3) has a
similar provision, requiring states laying cables or pipelines to "pay
due regard" to those already in position on the seabed. 196  States
exercising the high seas freedom to lay pipelines and cables, besides
having due regard for other states in those states' exercise of their
high seas freedoms, must also have due regard for cables and
pipelines already on the seabed.
UNCLOS Article 27(4), governing arrests aboard a foreign ship in
territorial sea passage, requires that "local authorities shall have due
regard to the interests of navigation .... ,,197 This language is similar
193. 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, para. 87.9(l) (footnote omitted); see also NWP I-
14M Annotated, supra note 16, para. 2.4.3 & n.65, at 131-32 (stating that "reasonable regard"
of the High Seas Convention, and the "due regard" standards of UNCLOS "are one and the
same and require any using nation to be cognizant of the interests of the interests of others in
using a high seas area, and to abstain from nonessential, exclusive uses which substantially
interfere with the exercise of other nations' high seas freedoms"); RESTATEMENT, supra note
8, § 521(3) ("reasonable regard"); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 226; CHURCHILL
& LOWE, supra note 2, at 206, 264; 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 57-58 ("reasonableness
of competing uses"); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 113, at 796, 798-99 (same, "due regard"); I
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 285, at 729 ("reasonable regard";
"weighting of freedoms may change with circumstances and with time"); Oxman, The
Regime, supra note 47, at 837-38 ("due regard"); Robertson, The "New," supra note 54, at
297 ("due regard"). NWP I-14M Annotated, supra note 16, and SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 26, adopted the due regard principle for LOAC situations. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
194. 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, para. 87.9(/) n.32; see also CHURCHILL & LOWE,
supra note 2, at 206.
195. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 79(5); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para.
79.8(e).
196. High Seas Convention, supra note 15, art. 26(3); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra
note 72, para. 79.2.
197. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 27(4); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para.
27.8(e).
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to that in the Territorial Sea Convention, Article 19(4).198 UNCLOS
Article 39(3)(a), addressing duties of aircraft during straits transit
passage, requires state aircraft to "at all times operate with due regard
for the safety of navigation," 199 a "principle applicable to the high seas
generally."2" Under Article 234, in ice-covered areas, "[c]oastal
States have the right to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution from ships within" their EEZ limits, but "[s]uch laws and
regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment .... 20
Article 56(2) requires that "[i]n exercising its rights and
performing its duties.. . in [its] exclusive economic zone, the coastal
State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States...
"202 Article 58(3) requires other states, in exercising their rights and
performing their duties in the EEZ, inter alia "shall have due regard to
the rights and duties of the coastal State .... .203 Article 60(3)
requires that a coastal state removing artificial islands, installations, or
structures in its EEZ "shall . . . have due regard to fishing, the
protection of the marine environment and the rights and duties of
other States. ' '2°  Article 66(3)(a), regulating anadromous fish stocks,
provides with respect to fishing beyond an EEZ's outer limits, "States
concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to achieving
agreement on terms and conditions of such fishing giving due regard
to the conservation requirements and the needs of the State of origin
in respect of these stocks. 2 °5 Commentators note that "[t]he concept
198. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 19(4) with id. art. 27(4); see also 2
COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 27.2.
199. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 39(3)(a); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72,
paras. 39.10(k)-39.10(l). State aircraft are not automatically subject to the Rules of the Air,
promulgated by the ICAO, like civil aircraft. Id. State aircraft should normally comply with
such safety measures and should always operate with due regard for safety of navigation, not
merely aerial navigation. Id.
200. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 521 cmt. d.
201. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 234; see also 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, paras.
234.1 (art. 234 is a lex specialis), 234.5(a), 234.5(e).
202. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 56(2).
203. Id. art. 58(3). See generally 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras. 56.4-56.5,
56.7.
204. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 60(3); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras.
60.11, 60.14, 60.15(f); NWP 1-14M Annotated, supra note 16, para. 2.4.2, at 129-30.
205. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 66(3)(a). See generally 2 COMMENTARY, supra note
72, paras. 66.3-66.8, 66.9(c)-66.9(d).
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of 'due regard' in the Convention balances the obligations of ... the
coastal State and other States within the EEZ.
' 20 6
Article 142(1), in Part XI, which provides for the Area, requires
that "[a]ctivities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in the
Area which lie across limits of national jurisdiction, shall be
conducted with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any
coastal State across whose jurisdiction such deposits lie. ' 2°7 Article
148 recites in part that "[t]he effective participation of developing
States in activities in the Area shall be promoted as specifically
provided for in this Part [XI], having due regard to their special
interests and needs ....208
Article 267 requires states, in promoting development and transfer
of marine technology, must "have due regard for all legitimate
interests, including, inter alia, the rights and duties of holders,
suppliers and recipients of marine technology.' 2 °' "[T]he expression
'due regard' . . . implies that all the relevant circumstances are to be
taken into consideration. 210
UNCLOS applies the due regard principle to Area governance and
management and to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf. Article 161(4), providing for Area Authority Council
membership, requires that "due regard should be paid to the
desirability of rotation of membership. 21 Similarly, Annex IV,
Article 5(1), in the Statute of the Enterprise for the Area, states that
[i]n the election of the members of the [Enterprise Governing] Board,
due regard shall be paid to the principle of equitable geographical
distribution.1 2 Article 5(2) requires that "due regard shall be paid to
the principle of rotation of membership. 21 3  UNCLOS Article
162(2)(d) requires the Area Council to establish subsidiary organs,
"with due regard to economy and efficiency"; and states that "due
account" must be taken of the principle of equitable geographical
206. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE
MARITIME CLAIMS 175 (2d ed. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 514, cmt. e &
reporters' n.3; BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 202 ("delicate balancing process"); 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 342, at 803; Robertson, The "New,"
supra note 54, at 285.
207. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 142(1).
208. Id. art. 148.
209. Id. art. 267.
210. 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 112, para. 267.3(b); see also id. paras. 267.1-267.2.
211. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 161(4).
212. Id. annex IV, art. 5(1).
213. Id. annex TV, art. 5(2).
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distribution and special interests.2 t4 Article 163(2) allows the Council
to increase the size of the Economic Planning Commission or the
Legal and Technical Commission, but with "due regard to economy
and efficiency. ' 2 5 Article 167(2) requires that "due regard ... be paid
to the importance of recruiting [and retaining the Authority] staff on
as wide a geographic basis as possible," subject to the paramount
consideration for "securing the highest standards of efficiency,
competence and integrity. '21 6 Annex IV, art. 7(3) echoes this
standard.2 7 Annex II, art. 2(1) requires members of the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to be elected from among
Convention parties, "having due regard to the need to ensure equitable
geographical representation .... 8
The San Remo Manual on the LOAC at sea has adopted "due
regard" formulations for regulating belligerents' rights and duties in
naval warfare, to which the law of the sea is subject through
UNCLOS's and the 1958 LOS Conventions' "other rules" clauses, 21 9
and neutrals' rights and duties under the law of the sea.22°
Commentators have noted another elusive term, "comity," which
has at least five meanings: a species of accommodation, not unrelated
to morality but distinguishable from it; "a synonym for international
law"; an "equivalent to private international law," or in U.S. usage,
conflict of laws; "a policy basis for, and source of, particular rules of
conflict"; and "as the reason for and source of . . . international
law. 221 Comity and due regard may be considered related. An often-
cited Supreme Court case said:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation ...
nor of mere courtesy and good will .... [I]t is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
214. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 162(2)(d).
215. Id. art. 163(2).
216. Id. art. 167(2).
217. Compare id. with id, annex IV, art. 7(3).
218. Id. annex H, art. 2(1); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. A..l 10(b).
219. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
220. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, paras. 12, 34, 36, 88, 106(c), reprinted in
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 25, at 1157, 1160-61, 1167, 1169 (less commentaries); see
also id. para. 37 ("take care" to avoid damaging cables, pipelines not exclusively serving
belligerent), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 25, at 1161 (less commentaries);
supra notes 54, 193 and accompanying text.
221. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 28; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8,
§§ 101 cmt. e, 403 cmt. a; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 1, § 17, at
50-52.
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convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who
are under the protection of its laws.
222
Whatever might be said about the nature of comity and its relationship
with "due regard," UNCLOS elevates "due regard" to a positive
command of law in various of its articles. Thus although warships
may exchange salutes on the high seas as a matter of courtesy and
good will, they must exercise reciprocal due regard under UNCLOS
or the High Seas Convention for each vessel's high seas freedoms.
2. Comments. Howard S. Schiffman proposed the term "due
regard.'223 The Chair researched the term.
3. Conclusions. "Due regard" has two components. The first is
awareness and consideration of either state interest(s) or other
factor(s); the second is balancing the interest(s) or factor(s) into
analysis for a decision. Although commentators have suggested that
this should occur in a negotiation process, 224 perhaps leading to an
agreement subsidiary to the Convention, 225 awareness, consideration,
and balancing can occur in ad hoc, practical situations as well, such as
meeting or overtaking situations among vessels on the high seas under
UNCLOS Article 87. With that introductory thought, these
definitions for "due regard" are proposed:
"Due regard," as used in the 1982 LOS Convention, art. 87, is a
qualification of the rights of states in exercising the freedoms of the high
seas. "Due regard" requires all states, in exercising their high seas
freedoms, to be aware of and consider the interests of other states in using
the high seas, and to refrain from activities that interfere with the exercise
by other states of the freedom of the high seas. States are bound to refrain
from any acts that might adversely affect the use of the high seas by
nationals of other states. Article 87 recognizes that all states have the
right to exercise high seas freedoms, and balances consideration for the
rights and interests of all states in this regard.
In Convention art. 79, "due regard" means that in addition to the due
regard that a state laying pipelines or cables must show to others
exercising high seas freedoms, that state must also be aware of and
consider the interests of other states that have previously laid pipelines or
cables and must balance the rights and interests of the state laying
pipelines or cables against other states' high seas freedoms and the rights
and interests of other states with respect to cables or pipelines already laid.
222. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
223. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
224. CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 2, at 206 (also suggesting third party dispute
settlement).
225. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 311(2)-311(6); see also Walker, The Tanker,
supra note 16, at 244-45. See generally 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 17, paras. 311.1, 311.4-
311.8, 311.11.
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In Convention art. 27(4), "due regard" means that a state conducting
an arrest aboard a foreign ship in territorial sea passage must be aware of
and consider the interests of other states whose ships are navigating in that
territorial sea area and must balance the arresting state's rights and
interests against the rights and interests of states conducting territorial sea
passage.
In Convention art. 39(3)(a), "due regard" means that a state aircraft in
straits transit passage must at all times be operated with awareness and
consideration of safety of navigation, by air and by other modes, in the
strait. The state aircraft's rights and interests in operating in straits transit
passage must be balanced against the rights and interests of states in
navigating the strait by air and by other modes.
In Convention art. 234, "due regard" means that in ice-covered areas
that are part of a coastal state's exclusive economic zone, that coastal
state, in adopting and enforcing nondiscriminatory laws and regulations
for preventing, reducing and controlling marine pollution from ships, must
be aware of and consider the right to navigation and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment in that ice-covered part of its
exclusive economic zone. That coastal state must balance these laws and
regulations against the rights and interests of other states to navigate, and
the obligation under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine
environment, in that ice-covered part of that coastal state's exclusive
economic zone.
In Convention art. 56(2), "due regard" means that a coastal state, in
exercising its rights and performing its duties in its exclusive economic
zone, must be aware of and consider the rights exercised by and the duties
of other states in that coastal state's exclusive economic zone. The coastal
state must balance its rights and duties against the rights and duties of
those other states in its exclusive economic zone.
In Convention art. 58(3), "due regard" means that other states, in
exercising their rights and performing their duties, inter alia must be
aware of and consider the rights exercised by and the duties of the coastal
state in its exclusive economic zone. Other states must balance their rights
and duties against the rights and duties of the coastal state in its exclusive
economic zone.
In Convention art. 60(3), "due regard" means that a coastal state
removing artificial islands, installations or structures in its exclusive
economic zone must be aware of and consider the rights of other states in
fishing, the protection of the maritime environment, and the rights and
duties of other states, in that coastal state's exclusive economic zone.
In Convention art. 66(3)(a), "due regard" means with respect to
fishing beyond exclusive economic zone limits, states concerned that
maintain consultations with a view to agreement on terms and conditions
of such fishing must be aware of and consider the conservation
requirements and needs of the state of origin in respect of art. 66-governed
anadromous fish stocks. States concerned must place into the balance the
conservation requirements and needs of the state of origin of these fish
stocks in these consultations.
In Convention art. 142(1), "due regard" means that with respect to
resource deposits in the Area which lie across limits of national
jurisdiction, the Authority and other states mining or otherwise having an
interest in Area resource deposits must be aware of and consider the rights
and legitimate interests of any coastal state across whose jurisdiction such
resource deposits lie. The Authority and those states must balance their
interests against the rights and legitimate interests of those coastal states.
In Convention art. 148, "due regard" means when there is promotion
of developing states' participation in activities in the Area as the
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Convention, Part XI provides, there must be awareness of and
consideration of those developing states' special interests and needs.
Those special interests and needs must be placed in the balance when
developing states' participation in activities in the Area are promoted.
In Convention art. 267, "due regard" means that when states promote,
develop and transfer marine technology, states must be aware of and
consider all legitimate interests, including the rights and duties of holders,
suppliers, and recipients of marine technology. Those legitimate interests,
including the rights and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of
marine technology, must be placed in the balance when states promote
development and transfer of marine technology. All relevant
circumstances must be taken into consideration.
In Convention art. 161(4), "due regard" paid to the desirability of
rotation of Area Authority Council membership means that those who
decide on Council membership must be aware of and consider rotating
Council membership. They must balance the rotation factor in
considering other legitimate factors for Council membership.
In Convention Annex IV, art. 5(1), "due regard" paid to the principle
of equitable geographical distribution in electing Area Enterprise
Governing Board members means that those who decide on Board
membership must be aware of and consider all legitimate factors,
including equitable geographical distribution. They must balance the
equitable geographical distribution factor when considering other
legitimate factors tor electing Board members.
In Convention Annex IV, art. 5(2), "due regard" paid to the principle
of rotation of Board membership means that those who decide on Board
membership must be aware of and consider rotating Board membership.
They must balance the rotation factor in considering other legitimate
factors for Board membership.
In Convention art. 162(2)(d), "due regard" to economy and efficiency
means that decision makers must be aware of and consider economy and
efficiency along with other legitimate factors. Economy and efficiency
must be balanced with other legitimate factors.
In Convention art. 163(2), "due regard" to economy and efficiency
means that the Area Council must be aware of and consider economy and
efficiency along with other legitimate factors in increasing the size of the
Area Economic Planning Commission and the Area Legal and Technical
Commission. Economy and efficiency must be balanced with other
legitimate factors.
In Convention art. 167(2) and in Convention Annex IV, art. 7(3), "due
regard" paid to the importance of recruiting and retaining Authority staff
on as wide a geographic basis as possible, subject to the paramount
consideration for securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence
and integrity, means that those who recruit and retain Authority staff must
be aware of and consider the importance of recruiting and retaining
Authority staff on as wide a geographic basis as possible, but subject to
the paramount consideration for securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence and integrity. Recruiting and retaining on as wide
a geographic basis as possible must be thrown into the balance along with
the paramount consideration for securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity.
In Convention Annex II, art. 2(1), "due regard" to the need to ensure
equitable geographical representation means that states parties to the
Convention, in electing members of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, must be aware of and consider equitable geographic
representation on the Commission. Equitable geographic representation
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must be balanced against other legitimate factors in electing Commission
members.
In LOAC-governed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
may apply. 226 The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or if jus cogens norms apply. 22
7
E. "Maximum sustainable yield."
1. Discussion and analysis. "Maximum sustainable yield"
appears in UNCLOS, Article 61(3), which deals with conservation of
living resources of the EEZ:
Such [coastal state conservation and management measures] shall also be
designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors .... and taking into account
fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally
recommended international minimum standards .... 228
The term also appears in UNCLOS, Article 119(1), which deals with
conservation of high seas living resources:
1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other
conservation measures for the living resources of the high seas, States
shall:
(a)take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence
available to the States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable
yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors....
and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and
any generally recommended international minimum standards .... 229
The Fishing Convention, Article 2 provides:
[T]he expression "conservation of the living resources of the high seas"
means the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum
sustainable yield from those resources. .. to secure a maximum supply of
food and other marine products. Conservation programmes should be
226. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
227. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56
and accompanying text.
228. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 61(3).
229. Id. art. 119(l)(a).
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formulated with a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for
human consumption.
230
Commentary for Article 61(3) elucidates the meaning of "maximum
sustainable yield":
[Maximum sustainable yield] refers to the levels of [living resource]
population abundance, the maintenance or restoration of which is one of
the primary objectives of the conservation measures . . . taken by the
coastal State. The English text [of Article 61(3)] uses... "as qualified"
by various other factors, embracing relevant and economic aspects ... The
French text [of Article 61(3)]- "eu egard' (having regard to)- expresses
the thrust of this provision.
. . . "[Miaximum sustainable yield" incorporates the concept of the
allowable catch, and is central to article 61. References to the allowable
catch are not yet common in national legislation, and there is no
established practice for determining it. Most States manage their fisheries
using a combination of biological and economic considerations. Where
legislation is framed in biological terms, it is difficult to reach any
conclusion as to the practical application of those criteria, above all
because in many instances fish are caught in multi-species fisheries where
it is virtually impossible to achieve simultaneously the maximum
sustainable yield of the different species. Most major coastal States
manage their fisheries to accomplish multiple economic and political
objectives, while attempting through national measures (which may
themselves originate in appropriate international bodies) to avoid serious
overexploitation.
231
Commentary for Article 119(1)(a) says the same definition for
"maximum sustainable yield" as in Article 61(3) is meant for Article
1 19(1)(a).232 It is a flexible concept.233
A definition for "optimum utilization" is proposed in Part III.F.
2. Comments. Howard S. Schiffman proposed the term
"maximum sustainable yield. ' ' 23 The Chair researched the term.,
3. Conclusions. This definition for "maximum sustainable yield"
is proposed:
"Maximum sustainable yield," as used in the 1982 LOS Convention, arts.
61 and 119, means that level of abundance of population of a living
resource which will assure maintaining or restoring that living resource. It
is one of the primary objectives of conservation measures taken by a state.
230. Fishing Convention, supra note 15, art. 2.
231. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras. 61.12(g)-61.12(h).
232. 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, para. 119.7(c).
233. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 334, at 796; see also 1
O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 564-55.
234. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
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In LOAC-governed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
may apply.235 The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or if jus cogens norms apply. 236
F. "Optimum utilization."
1. Discussion and analysis. "Optimum utilization" appears in
UNCLOS, Article 62(1): "The coastal State shall promote the
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the
exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. ' '237 Article
61 establishes standards for conservation of EEZ living resources.238
Commentary on UNCLOS, Article 62(1) discusses the origins of
"optimum utilization":
The only specific references to utilization in fishery proposals had called
for the coastal State to "ensure the full utilization" . . . or "assure the
maximum utilization"..... Those references differed from the obligation
to "promote the objective" of optimum utilization, which contrasts
considerably with "ensuring" that objective or "seeking" that objective on
all occasions .... [O]ptimum" also differs from "full" and "maximum,"
and in biological and economic terms may suggest a lower level of
utilization.
239
The Fishing Convention, Article 2 provides:
[T]he expression "conservation of the living resources of the high seas"
means the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum
sustainable yield from those resources... to secure a maximum supply of
food and other marine products. Conservation programmes should be
formulated with a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for
human consumption. 
240
A definition for "maximum sustainable yield" is proposed in Part
III.E.
235. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
236. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56
and accompanying text.
237. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 62(1).
238. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 61; supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
239. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 62.16(b) (referring to documentation
reprinted in paras. 62.3, 62.5); see also id. 62.16(c); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 8, pt. 2 § 335. at 797.
240. Fishing Convention, supra note 15, art. 2.
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2. Comments. Howard S. Schiffman proposed the term
"optimum utilization. ' 24' The Chair researched the term.
3. Conclusions. This definition for "optimum utilization" is
proposed:
"Optimal utilization," as used in the 1982 LOS Convention, art. 62(1),
means utilization of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone at
a level of utilization that may be less than full or maximum utilization.
Whether measured according to biological or economic terms, optimum
utilization may be a lower level of utilization of the living resources of the
exclusive economic zone. The art. 62(1) optimum utilization standard is
subject to the rules of art. 61 concerning conservation of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zone.
In LOAC-governed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
may apply.24 The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or if jus cogens norms apply.243
G. "Regional" or "subregional" organization.
1. Discussion and analysis. The phrase, "regional or subregional
organizations," appears in UNCLOS, Article 63, in Part V, governing
the EEZ:
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall
seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and
ensure the conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice
to the other provisions of this Part.
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within
the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the
zone, the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the
adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional
or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the
conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.244
241. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
242. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
243. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56
and accompanying text.
244. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 63.
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Article 63 commentaries do not define "subregional" or "regional"
organizations, but they underscore the importance of Article 63's
obligations to seek agreement, and list agreements, on these stocks.245
The phrase, "regional organizations," appears in Article 66(5):
"The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing
these stocks shall make arrangements for the implementation of the
provisions of this article, where appropriate, through regional
organizations. ' 2 6  Article 66 commentaries do not define
"subregional" or "regional" organizations, but they underscore the
importance of Article 63's obligations to seek agreement, and list
agreements, on this stock.247
The phrase, "subregional or regional fisheries organizations,"
appears in Article 118, in Part VII, governing the high seas:
States shall cooperate.. . in the conservation and management of living
resources in . . . the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical
living resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter
into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the
conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate,
cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to
this end.248
Although Article 118 commentary does not define "subregional" or
"regional" fishing organizations, it illustrates their number and
variety, and provides examples of bilateral and multilateral
agreements to manage species or fish stock in a given region of the
high seas.249 Articles 4(1) and 6(3) of the Fishing Convention require
States to participate in negotiations for agreements related to
conserving high seas resources.
Definitions for "appropriate international organization,"
"appropriate international organizations," "the competent international
organization" and "competent international organizations" are
proposed in Parts III.A and C. A definition for "associated and
dependent species" is proposed in Part III.B.
245. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, paras. 63.12(a), 63.12(d); see CHURCHILL & LOWE,
supra note 2, at 207-08, 293-96.
246. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 66(5).
247. 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 72, para. 66.9(c); see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note
2, at 207-08, 293-96.
248. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 118.
249. 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, paras. 118.7(c)-l 8.7(d). See generally
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 296-305.
250. Fishing Convention, supra note 15, arts. 4(1), 6(3) (requiring participation once
any party to a dispute requests negotiations).
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2. Comments. The Chair researched these terms in connection
with "appropriate international organization," "appropriate
international organizations," "competent international organization"
and "competent international organizations," terms proposed by
Howard S. Schiffman.25 l
3. Conclusions. These definitions for "regional" or "subregional"
organizations are proposed:
"Regional" or "subregional" organizations as used in the 1982 LOS
Convention, art. 63, means that organization or those organizations below
the global level typically associated by principles, purposes and functions
with action required by particular articles of the Convention or its
Annexes related to the exclusive economic zone, and may be an
intergovernmental organization (IGO) or IGOs organized pursuant to the
U.N. Charter, an independent IGO or independent IGOs, or a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) or NGOs.
"Regional" organizations as used in the 1982 LOS Convention, art. 66,
means that organization or those organizations below the global level
typically associated by principles, purposes and functions with action
required by particular articles of the Convention or its Annexes related to
the exclusive economic zone, and may be an intergovernmental
organization (IGO) or IGOs organized pursuant to the U.N. Charter, an
independent IGO or independent IGOs, or a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) or NGOs.
"Regional" or "subregional" fishing organizations as used in the 1982
LOS Convention, art. 118, means that organization or those organizations
below the global level typically associated by principles, purposes and
functions with action required by particular articles of the Convention or
its Annexes related to fishing on the high seas, and may be an
intergovernmental organization (IGO) or IGOs organized pursuant to the
U.N. Charter, an independent IGO or independent IGOs, or a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) or NGOs.
In LOAC-governed situations under the "other rules of
international law" clauses in the Convention, a different definition
may apply.2 2 The same may be the situation if the Charter supersedes
the Convention, or if jus cogens norms apply. 253
IV. CONCLUSIONS
After reciting the ABILA LOS Committee's research
methodology in Part I of this article, Part II stated proposed principles
for subordinating commentator definitions, like those of the ABILA
251. Shiffman E-mail, supra note 24.
252. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
253. See Walker, Definitions III, supra note 19, at 232-36; supra notes 35-47, 51-56
and accompanying text.
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LOS Committee, to definitions in the understandings, declarations,
and statements that the Convention allows. These proposed
definitions, insofar as they do not contradict primary sources (i.e.,
definitions in an applicable treaty,254 customary law, or general
principles of law) should receive acceptance as a secondary source of
law, to be considered alongside other secondary sources. Part III
submitted a final group of terms for which the Committee proposes
definitions. These proposed definitions, together with others
developed since 2001, will be published in a Tentative Final Draft,
probably in 2006.255
The Committee's work on definitions for UNCLOS appears close
to ending. Undoubtedly, there will be a need for review of the
Committee's work as the Convention proceeds toward worldwide
acceptance as conventional and customary law and as new claims or
cases arise. For now, the Committee's request is a final call for
comments on this and its prior work. Committee members and others
interested in this project are invited to submit final comments on these
proposed definitions and proposed definitions published since 2001 at
their earliest convenience. The Committee repeats its thanks for all
prior submissions and comments.
254. The Committee expressly limited its research to definitions that are not in
UNCLOS; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
255. See generally supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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